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PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
JOSEPH LANDAU*
ABSTRACT
As the judicial and legislative branches have taken a more passive
approach to civil rights enforcement, the President’s exercise of
independent, extrajudicial constitutional judgment has become
increasingly important. Modern U.S. presidents have advanced
constitutional interpretations on matters of race, gender, HIV-status,
self-incrimination, reproductive liberty, and gun rights, and
President Obama has been especially active in promoting the rights
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons—most
famously by refusing to defend the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
Commentators have criticized the President’s refusal to defend
DOMA from numerous perspectives but have not considered how the
President’s DOMA policy fits within a principled commitment to
LGBT equality that includes supporting and signing legislation,
pursuing regulatory initiatives, filing complaints and other court
papers, making formal and informal choices in law enforcement, and
using the bully pulpit to sway public opinion. The President’s
nondefense of DOMA not only derives normative force from his larger
vision regarding substantive equality and individual rights, but it
also demonstrates how certain features of the presidency—including
accountability and expertise—can be instrumental in promoting
equality-based claims. In this way, presidential constitutionalism
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can engage coordinate institutions—including the Supreme
Court—in the development of constitutional law.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the Supreme Court has left undecided large
questions at the intersection of individual liberty and governmental
power,  leaving many constitutional doctrines—in particular those1
regarding civil rights—to develop outside the context of litigation.2
As the Court has failed to “pronounce the law of the Constitution”
where civil rights are concerned,  commentators have focused on3
ways that Congress can enforce the Constitution through its powers
under the Commerce Clause  and the Fourteenth Amendment.4 5
Lately, however, Congress has been unable to exercise its law-
making power over much of anything, much less constitutional
implementation or civil rights enforcement.  In the absence of a6
1. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, JUDICIAL MINIMALISM]; Cass R. Sunstein, The
Supreme Court, 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996);
see also infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 303-15 and accompanying text. 
3. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2003); see id. at 76 (noting the
Supreme Court’s “essential mission of protecting individual rights”); see also Robert Post, The
Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and
Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1272 (2001) (arguing that the
Supreme Court is “the highest and the last source of appellate review, whose chief function
[is] correctly to discern and to protect the federal rights of litigants”); Recent Publications, 120
HARV. L. REV. 2254, 2256 (2007) (reviewing REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY:
CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2006)) (“The
federal courts have acquired the honored distinction—at least among constitutional law
students and scholars—of being the primary guarantors of individual rights.”); cf. Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial
Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1127 (2010) (“The courts thus could not rely on the people
to protect individual rights because even if the people cared about those rights in a general
sense, Chief Justice Gibson doubted whether they would notice the breach of those rights and
do anything in response.”).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., Symposium, The Commerce Clause: Past, Present,
and Future, 55 ARK. L. REV. 705 (2003).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection
By Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441
(2000).
6. The 112th Congress, which sat from January 2011 to January 2013, was the least
productive on record, enacting a mere 284 laws. See Bills by Final Status, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Mar. 16, 2014); Mark Murray,
Unproductive Congress: How Stalemates Became the Norm in Washington DC, NBC
NEWS (June 30, 2013), http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/30/19206400-unproductive-
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strong judicial or legislative role in enforcing civil rights,  attention7
has shifted to ways the executive can place constitutional interpre-
tation in the service of civil rights enforcement.  8
This Article explores the President’s role in employing his own
interpretation of the Constitution to promote individual rights, a
practice that enjoys a long and storied pedigree dating back to
President Jefferson’s resistance to the Alien and Sedition Acts.  In9
more modern times, U.S. presidents have advanced civil rights
through constitutional interpretations bearing on race,  gender,10 11
HIV-status,  self-incrimination,  reproductive liberty,  gun12 13 14
rights,  and—most recently—sexual orientation.  Although there15 16
can be profound disagreements about what, precisely, constitutes
“civil rights”—and while the differing constitutional arguments
across presidential administrations, and the efforts behind them,
are not all normatively equivalent—the President’s capacity as
national representative and barometer on broader legal, social, and
congress-how-stalemates-became-the-norm-in-washington-dc?lite; see also Cliff Sikora &
Bonnie Suchman, What the Energy Industry Can Expect from President Obama’s Second Term
and a New Congress, ABA TRENDS (Sec. of Env’t, Energy & Resources of the ABA, Chi., Ill.),
Mar./Apr. 2013, at 8, 9 (“The general consensus among Beltway insiders is that the 112th
Congress, which concluded at the end of 2012, was the least productive Congress in recent
history. And the session did not end on a high note. Facing a fiscal cliff that included the
expiration of the Bush tax cuts and sequestration (the mandatory cuts in defense and
nondefense discretionary programs), as well as the looming debt ceiling and expiration of the
continuing resolution, Congress only managed to address the expiring tax cuts.”). The current
113th Congress is on track to continue or even surpass its predecessor in terms of
unproductiveness. See id. 
7. In a series of decisions, the Rehnquist Court diluted or voided efforts by Congress to
legislate pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (imposing limits on congressional power to
legislate to protect constitutional rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (same with respect to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (same with respect to
Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
8. See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Lessons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism for the
Twenty-first Century, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 239 (2007).
9. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See infra Part II.D.
14. See infra Part II.E.
15. See infra Part II.F.
16. See infra Part III.
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cultural ideas can make him an ideal figure to place his faculty of
interpretation, and his bully pulpit, in the service of civil rights.
While constitutional scholars have posited an important role for
the President as an initiator of constitutional change in general,17
this Article considers how certain features of presidential adminis-
trations—including the President’s accountability, access to
information, and expertise —can be instrumental in promoting18
liberty- and equality-based claims in particular. Just as electoral
accountability supports presidential decisions to advance reasonable
interpretations of statutes where Congress leaves a gap in delegat-
ing authority to the executive,  presidential constitutionalism can19
articulate and help define the contours of constitutional rights the
Court has yet to clarify. This is especially so when a President
declares his positions openly and transparently, including cam-
paigning on civil rights issues he plans to help implement upon
taking office. Inasmuch as congressional-executive bilateral
agreements can bring added legitimacy to various policy
initiatives,  a joint executive-judicial dialogue on constitutional20
meaning can provide new opportunities for the political
branches—and especially the President, as constitutional actor—to
help break stalemates in Supreme Court doctrine. 
If “[m]ost Americans expect modern Presidents to provide
solutions for every significant political, military, social, and
economic problem,”  the President—the only democratically elected21
17. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1788 (2007) (“The
civil rights era is simply one more variation on the great theme of presidential leadership,
with movement support, for constitutional change in the name of the American people.”).
18. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 119 (1990) (noting the President’s “speed, secrecy,
flexibility, and efficiency that no other governmental institution can match”); see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (noting the benefits
of delegation, including the ability of the executive branch to bring its expertise, access to
information, and democratic accountability to bear on questions of policy).
19. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-67 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also, e.g., Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown: National Security and
the Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917, 1919-22 (2012) (arguing that recent national
security rulings have validated executive branch policies with congressional endorsement and
rejected those lacking in legislative validation).
21. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8
(1993).
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official accountable to the entire U.S. populace—can bring a unique
authority to the interpretation of laws, including the Constitution,
through a variety of different means. On such matters, the Presi-
dent’s commitment to deep principles can be said to properly reflect
“the contemporary legal culture, which inevitably includes its con-
stitutional law.”  In some cases, owing to the coordinate branches’22
built-in limitations, presidential constitutionalism may be the only
way to channel widely held beliefs that no court or legislature will
vindicate or champion.
United States v. Windsor provides an important case study in
presidential constitutionalism.  President Obama’s refusal to de-23
fend the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA),  coupled with his Administration’s broader strategy to24
keep the case in court,  helped produce an important substantive25
outcome for same-sex couples. The move sparked great controversy:
some accused the Administration of abusing its power,  while oth-26
ers argued that the Administration shirked its responsibility to stop
enforcing a law it believed unconstitutional.  Yet the significance27
of the Obama Administration’s legal position regarding DOMA
stretches well beyond the pure separation of powers question
22. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Con-
stitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 562-63 (1990) (describing
federal judges’ deference to statutory interpretations that reflect constitutional law principles).
23. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
24. Section 3 of DOMA defined marriage as “a legal union between one man and one wo-
man,” reserving “the word ‘spouse’ ... only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
a wife.” Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996). It
applied that definition to “the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States.” Id. 
25. See Letter from Eric H. Holder Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S.
House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
February/11-ag-223.html. 
26. Former Solicitor General Charles Fried called the Obama Administration’s nondefense
policy “an unbecoming, not to mention totally unconvincing, use of excessive ingenuity in
squirming out of an unpleasant duty”—namely, the executive’s duty to defend congressional
acts. See Adam Liptak, The President’s Courthouse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, at WK5. Orin
Kerr likened the policy to “the Bush Administration’s reliance on its Article II theories”
during the war on terror. Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend
DOMA, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/02/
23/the-executive-power-grab-in-the-decision-not-to-defend-doma/.
27. See infra notes 260-65 and accompanying text. During oral arguments in Windsor,
Chief Justice Roberts assailed the President for lacking “the courage of his convictions.” Trans-
cript of Oral Argument at 12, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307). 
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regarding the branch of government best suited to resolve the law’s
enforceability.  The President’s nondefense of DOMA was consis-28
tent with a broader set of executive branch policies that imple-
mented prior Supreme Court rulings regarding the rights of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons. Additionally, the
President’s Windsor strategy championed a new constitutional rule
(namely, heightened scrutiny for LGBT-based classifications) that
the federal courts had yet to adopt.  The Obama Administration’s29
commitment to LGBT equality, which spanned both constitutional
implementation and constructions of operative meaning,  derived30
additional normative force from the President’s public airing and
assertion of those constitutional values during campaigns and after
taking office.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the concept of
presidential constitutionalism by laying out its basic attributes and
the surrounding literature. Part II discusses the broader historical
practice of presidential constitutionalism and how modern presiden-
tial administrations have placed constitutional interpretation in the
service of individual rights. Part III situates the Obama Administra-
tion’s nondefense of DOMA within President Obama’s broader
constitutional vision for LGBT people and same-sex couples—which
spans statutory interpretation, rulemaking, and formal and infor-
mal policy decisions in labor and employment, immigration, health
care, fair housing, and a host of other matters. Part IV discusses the
normative implications of presidential constitutionalism, including
28. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684-89.
29. The Second Circuit vindicated that rule when, in Windsor, it invalidated DOMA
Section 3 and became the first federal appellate court to apply heightened judicial scrutiny
in the context of LGBT rights. 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
30. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2004)
(distinguishing “constitutional operative propositions (judicial statements of what the
Constitution means) from constitutional decision rules (judicial statements of how courts
should decide whether the operative propositions have been complied with)”); id. at 32-33
(“[J]udicial review is essentially a two-step process: First, a court interprets the Constitution;
second, it applies that interpretation to the facts of the case to reach a constitutional
holding.”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997) (“Identifying the ‘meaning’ of
the Constitution is not the Court’s only function. A crucial mission of the Court is to
implement the Constitution successfully. In service of this mission, the Court often must craft
doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but does not reflect the Constitution’s meaning
precisely.”).
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the President’s crucial role in fostering dialogue with the coordinate
branches—especially the courts—on matters of individual liberty.
The Article concludes with a brief discussion of additional frontiers
in presidential constitutionalism, including gender equity and the
rights of foreign nationals.
I. WHAT IS PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM?
A. The Features of Presidential Constitutionalism
Although there is no perfect, singular definition of presidential
constitutionalism, it is worth identifying three significant and
recurring attributes discussed in this Article. While these attributes
do not supply a consistent, three-part test that defines all exercises
of presidential constitutionalism, they can help us understand how
presidential constitutionalism can advance constitutional interpre-
tations, especially in the context of civil rights and in conversation
with the coordinate branches.
First, authority and power are central to presidential consti-
tutionalism. The President is Commander in Chief of the Arm-
ed Forces and possesses an important (if indeterminate) “executive
Power” as well as certain foreign-affairs powers, including the
power  to make treaties with the consent of two- thirds of the
Senate and to appoint and receive ambassadors and other public
ministers.  The Constitution also grants the President the power31
to sign and veto legislation;  execute, implement, and interpret32
laws passed by Congress;  exercise prosecutorial discretion  bring33 34
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2; see Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1281-82 (1996) (discussing an
expansive power based on the Vesting Clause of Article II).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
33. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 31, at 1284-86, 1312-13 (discussing the power to
execute the laws pursuant to the Vesting and Take Care Clauses within Article II); cf.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (“While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving
the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute
in light of everyday realities.”).
34. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
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affirmative litigation or participate as amicus;  and, at times,35
refuse to enforce or defend legislation.  Finally, the President,36
legitimated by the electoral system, serves as a representative of the
populace at large.  While the scope of executive power in the37
precincts of both constitutional interpretation and law making are
subject to much disagreement, it is axiomatic that both the
Constitution and Congress provide the President with powers that,
at least in certain instances, necessitate independent
interpretation.  On some of these occasions, presidential powers38
provide opportunities for interpretation with a measure of
independence and influence on the direction for the development of
constitutional law.
A second feature of presidential constitutionalism concerns a
President’s intent, or motivation, to affect constitutional interpreta-
tion.  Sometimes it is apparent that a President is engaging in39
constitutional interpretation; at other times the distinction between
a constitutional position and mere policy statement is less clear.40
Of course, there can be overlaps between the two. Moreover, while
a moral or political view about equality is not necessarily the same
35. See infra notes 47, 77 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 87, 99, 110-12, 180 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive,
48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 36, 59 (1995) (discussing that only the President “speaks for the entire
American people” and that he possesses a “unique claim to legitimacy” as the only
representative “accountable to a national voting electorate and no one else”). 
38. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
39. Authorship can matter to presidential constitutionalism as well, and thus a distinction
should be drawn, in the context of constitutional interpretation, between pronouncements
that reflect the President’s own judgment and those asserted through proxies. Thus it may
be important to consider the extent to which the President personally stands behind various
constitutional positions his administration takes, as opposed to taking a more passive
approach while cabinet officials advance various constitutional positions. In the latter case,
the constitutional positions pursued do not necessarily reflect a President’s judgment and are
less closely connected to presidential accountability, which can supply an important source
of legitimacy for presidential constitutional interpretations. 
40. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183,
1229 (2012) (“[P]residents may be tempted to equate what is misguided or immoral with what
is unconstitutional; indeed, Justice Jackson said exactly that about FDR, a leader whom he
served and greatly admired.”); cf. id. at 1229-30 (“[E]ven if the policy issues of greatest
concern to the public are rarely constitutional ones, a subset of constitutional issues may be
politically salient because of their importance in particular electoral districts or with
particular constituencies.”).
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as a constitutional one, moral and political views can be relevant to
presidential constitutionalism. In the sphere of individual rights,
judicial rulings have tended to expand according to evolving notions
of legal, political, and moral equality, though not always in the
clearest manner. Presidential constitutionalism can effectively
promote readings of the law that help identify a broader and clearer
articulation of prior Court doctrine.
Third, although a President’s interventions may not particularly
affect the law in a tangible way, the impact of presidential
constitutionalism can be discerned in legal changes occurring either
within the executive branch or in changes in legislatures and
courts—either immediately or in the future. When presidential
interventions do affect constitutional law, they can have a lasting
effect that transcends future party changes;  at the same time,41
regardless of whether presidential interventions affect constitu-
tional law, they can influence conversations around questions of
constitutional rights and individual liberty, especially where the
current doctrinal formulations and understandings are inchoate,
underdeveloped, or even mysterious. Thus, a President who uses the
bully pulpit to address gender equality, gay rights, or sentencing
disparities undoubtedly shapes the way the public understands and
discusses the related substantive policies. Although, as a practical
matter, a President may be more likely to employ constitutional
interpretation during periods of divided government,  a general42
inquiry regarding presidential constitutionalism and its effect on
the coordinate branches can provide insights into how, and why,
constitutional innovation takes place outside the courts. Rather
than “sanction unjust results and ... submerge critical debate over
41. For a discussion of the lasting impact of executive branch decision making in the civil
rights context, see Mathew S. Nosanchuk, The Endurance Test: Executive Power and the Civil
Rights of LGBT Americans, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 440, 469 (2012) (discussing the lasting
impact of prior executive branch initiatives despite change in party affiliation of subsequent
administration).
42. Scholars have noted a consistent pattern of divided government for “thirty of the past
forty years.” Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
395, 410 (2009); see also Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-
For-Hostages, “Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups”, 12
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 518 (2003) (explaining that divided government has persisted
“during most of the post-Vietnam War era”).
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substantive justice,”  the President can enlist the Court’s help to43
promote a more transparent debate over the questions at stake.
B. The Scholarly Debate Regarding Presidential
Constitutionalism
The scholarly debate concerning presidential constitutionalism
runs a spectrum from Judicial Supremacy on the one hand to
Departmentalism on the other. Scholars tend to apply one of three
leading theories to a range of presidential authorities that include
the power to veto laws,  abstain from bringing unconstitutional44
criminal prosecutions,  participate in constitutional litigation,45 46
and, more sparingly, refuse to defend (or even more rarely refuse to
enforce) congressional acts.  As scholars have also noted, executive47
branch practice has rather consistently followed a middle-ground
approach between Departmentalism and Judicial Supremacy.  48
43. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 964 (1989).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
45. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1191.
46. See, e.g., Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor
General, 75 IND. L.J. 1297, 1305-06 (2000) (describing steps taken by the Truman
Administration to engage the federal government through civil rights litigation).
47. See, e.g., David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s
Non-Enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 76-81 (2000); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 919-20 (1990); Eugene Gressman, Take
Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 381-82 (1986); Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-
Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8-9
(2000) [hereinafter Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement]; Christopher N. May, Presidential
Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.
Q. 865, 868 (1994); Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40
VAND. L. REV. 389, 395 (1987); Burt Neuborne, The Role of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 376 (1988); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J.
217, 261 (1994); Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 108-10 (2000).
48. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, John Roberts and the SG’s Refusal to Defend Federal
Statutes in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 8, 2005, 12:11 AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/09/john-roberts-and-sgs-refusal-to-defend.html (“As a general
matter, the [DOJ] has traditionally adhered to a policy of defending the constitutionality of
federal enactments whenever ‘reasonable’ arguments can be made in support of such
statutes.”); see also Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1199-1200 (2012) (describing how Dellinger’s
position that “the executive’s enhanced responsibility to resist unconstitutional provisions
that encroach upon the constitutional powers of the presidency ... has been followed
consistently by presidential administrations”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Johnsen,
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On one end of the spectrum, Judicial Supremacy asserts that the
judiciary provides a single, authoritative view of the Constitution
that the political branches cannot augment through independent
interpretation.  Anything else would undermine the judiciary and49
pose a dangerous threat to the separation of powers and a violation
of the terms of Article II. While the President has some discretion
at the margins (for instance, with respect to prosecutorial discre-
tion),  he must in the first instance and as a general matter enforce50
and defend the law.  A more extreme interpretation of judicial51
supremacy, known as judicial exclusivity, holds that all presidential
interpretations must be grounded in constitutional views set forth
in prior judicial decisions.  52
Departmentalism calls for a distinct presidential role in constitu-
tional interpretation on par with that of the coordinate branches.53
Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 47, at 23 (“The best formulations of a context-
dependent approach to non-enforcement, and the formulations most consistent with past
presidential practice, are found in a 1980 letter from Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti to
a U.S. Senator and a 1994 letter from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the
Counsel to the President.”) (citations omitted).
49. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections
and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 784 (2002) (“Judicial supremacy requires deference by
other government officials to the constitutional dictates of the Court, even when other
government officials think that the Court is substantively wrong about the meaning of the
Constitution and in circumstances that are not subject to judicial review.”). 
50. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
51. May, supra note 47, at 873 (“[W]hile there is no explicit rejection of a presidential
suspending power, there is convincing evidence in the text of the Constitution and in the
debates surrounding its adoption that most of the Founders endorsed the English Bill of
Rights’ principle that a statute may be suspended only by the lawmaking authority, and not
by the Executive acting alone.”). 
52. This is the position, articulated in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), that because
“the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,” the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is the “supreme law of the
land.” Id.; see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (defending “Cooper and its assertion of
judicial primacy without qualification”). 
53. The argument is based on a combination of the Presidential Oath and the Supremacy
Clause—in particular, the idea that “faithfully executing the laws” requires the President to
execute the Constitution as the “supreme law of the land.” See Neal Devins & Saikrishna
Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 523 (2012) (“Article II
obliges the President to take an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. When
he identifies a law as unconstitutional, he should not enforce it, for to execute it would be to
erode, rather than preserve, the Constitution. In other words, even as Article II requires
faithful execution of constitutional laws, it forbids the executive from executing
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On the strongest view of Departmentalism, the President possesses
an independent interpretive authority that not only allows but also
requires that he refuse to enforce (or defend) statutes he believes to
be unconstitutional.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, Neal Devins, and54
Saikrishna Prakash all argue that executive officers should not
defer to constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court with
which they disagree. As they see it, the textual obligation that the
President “take Care” that the laws—including the Constitution—be
faithfully executed implies a role for the President to decide for
himself what is constitutional.  As Prakash noted recently, “If the55
President believes a law is unconstitutional, he should not enforce
it, much less defend its constitutionality.”  56
Most scholars adopt a view somewhere between the poles of
Departmentalism and Judicial Supremacy. On the one hand, they
accept the Departmentalist instinct that the President retain some
power to interpret the Constitution; on the other hand, they endorse
a premise of Judicial Supremacy that presidential constitutionalism
should typically give way to the Supreme Court’s definitive interpre-
tation of the Constitution. Thus, while they allow that the President
may occasionally choose not to enforce or defend a statute he
unconstitutional ones.”) (citations omitted).
54. That includes a presidential power to disregard the Supreme Court’s resolution of
various constitutional questions. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 47, at 222 (arguing that the
President “may refuse to execute (or, where directed specifically to him, refuse to obey)
judicial decrees that he concludes are contrary to law”); see also Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, Missing Links in the President’s Evolution on Same-Sex Marriage, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 553, 569-70 (2012) [hereinafter Prakash, Missing Links] (“Because the Constitution
never demands that he obey anyone else’s interpretation of it, the President need not adopt
judicial understandings, tests, and formulas. Instead, the President may decide for himself
what the Constitution demands or permits, just as the courts may decide for themselves. That
is to say, he should act on his own constitutional conclusions as he goes about preserving and
protecting the Constitution, including disregarding statutes he believes are unconstitutional.”)
(footnotes omitted). 
55. See Prakash, Missing Links, supra note 54, at 569-70; see also LARRY KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 252-53 (2004);
Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C. L. REV.
1551, 1587 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2610 (2006) (concluding that “much of the time, it is emphatically
the province and duty of the executive branch to say what the law is”); Mark Tushnet,
Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781, 2782 (2003); Whittington,
supra note 49, at 782-83.
56. Prakash, Missing Links, supra note 54, at 569. 
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believes to be unconstitutional, they recommend a more sparing use
of that power. Unlike most Judicial Supremacists and
Departmentalists who look to constitutional text or structure for
guidance,  middle-ground theorists generally consider institutional,57
prudential, or other considerations as the basis for legitimate acts
of presidential constitutionalism.
Daniel Meltzer provides a leading account of presidential
constitutionalism that lies somewhere between Departmentalism
and Judicial Supremacy.  For Meltzer, the President’s obligation to58
defend congressional acts arises not from “a legal rule derivable
from the Constitution itself, but [a]s a matter of judgment, informed
by a welter of historical and institutional concerns.”  Meltzer59
resolves the question of whether the President should enforce and
defend federal statutes based on traditional institutional practices
and expectations of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Considering
a range of factors,  Meltzer argues that the President should strive60
for institutional continuity and defend congressional acts “even
when [he] views them as wrongheaded, discriminatory, and indeed
as shameful denials of equal protection,”  for anything else could61
result in an “unraveling of the executive branch’s practice of
defending federal statutes.”  However, Meltzer argues that62
nondefense is acceptable in those rare situations in which a stat-
ute is so clearly unconstitutional that no good argument can be
made on its behalf  or when a statute undermines the separation63
57. Judicial Supremacists and Departmentalists tend to look to the Presidential Oath of
Office, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“[The President] will faithfully execute the Office of
President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] ability, preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States.”), the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI,
§ 2 (“[The Constitution is] the supreme Law of the Land.”), and the Take Care Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”),
as well as separation of powers principles.
58. Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1208-09.
59. Id. at 1184.
60. Id. at 1209 (considering “the division of labor between executive and congressional
lawyers, the relationship between career and politically appointed lawyers within the
executive branch, the preservation of the Justice Department’s credibility with the courts, the
avoidance of friction with Congress, and the maintenance of the integrity of executive officials
subject to Senate confirmation”). 
61. Id. at 1235.
62. Id. at 1187.
63. Id. at 1198-99. 
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of powers.  Absent these strictly limited circumstances, however,64
the potential costs of a President’s decision to undermine Congress
are outweighed by the executive branch’s institutional obligation to
defend federal statutes.65
Another advocate of the middle-ground view between
Departmentalism and Judicial Supremacy is Dawn Johnsen,  who66
64. Id. at 1199-1201. In the latter case, Meltzer argues that there is an “equally important
interest” for the President to “resist unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon the
constitutional powers of the Presidency.” Id. (quoting Presidential Authority to Decline to
Execute Unconstitutional States, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 201 (1994)). Meltzer contends that
administrations consistently refuse to enforce or defend statutes that encroach on presidential
power. For example, President Andrew Johnson refused to comply with the Tenure of Office
Act, which required the President to obtain approval from the Senate to discharge heads of
Cabinet departments. Id. at 1192. Johnson believed the statute was unconstitutional and
sought to remove Secretary of War Edwin Stanton without senatorial consent. Id. at 1192-93.
The President was impeached for failing to execute a law passed by the Congress; eventually,
however, the Supreme Court validated Johnson’s decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 176 (1926). Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1192-93.
65. Meltzer articulates a number of reasons why the executive branch is better able to
defend congressional acts than Congress. Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1210-12 (noting, inter
alia, (1) that it is uncertain whether Congress may intervene as a party at the district court
level; (2) that an amicus brief submitted by Congress may not be given as much clout as one
from DOJ; (3) that some judges might resist upholding a statute if both the executive branch
and the statute’s challengers agree that it is unconstitutional, putting Congress at an
immediate disadvantage; and (4) that Congress may not intervene or file an amicus brief
without authorization from one of the houses of Congress, making Congress’s ability to
participate a function of the “political vicissitudes of the moment”). He also points out that the
executive’s refusal to defend federal statutes can cause friction between the Justice
Department’s leadership and career lawyers. Id. at 1213-14, 1217 (arguing that
administrations might begin “picking and choosing” whether to defend statutes based on their
policy preferences, putting a significant strain on the relationship between DOJ officials and
career lawyers). Nondefense can also cause the executive to lose credibility with the courts,
lead to internal strife, and possibly spark adverse reactions in Congress. See id. at 1217-20.
66. See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 47; see also Dawn Johnsen,
The Obama Administration’s Decision to Defend Constitutional Equality Rather than the
Defense of Marriage Act, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 605-06 (2012) [hereinafter Johnsen, Defend
Constitutional Equality] (rejecting both “a strong departmentalist view” of “[r]outine
unilateral presidential nonenforcement” and “the other extreme ... [of] mandatory
enforcement and defense of all statutory provisions,” and advocating “an intermediate
approach ... [of] ‘functional departmentalism’” pursuant to which “[p]residents should act
upon their independent constitutional views only to the extent consistent with the
constitutional functions of Congress and the courts and only to the extent consistent with the
discernment and development of constitutional meaning (distinct from simply the
advancement of the President’s own views)”); Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do?
Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395,
396 (2008) [hereinafter Johnsen, What’s a President to Do?] (arguing that the President has
a role in constitutional interpretation).
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argues that presidents should be guided by the twin goals to
“preserve[ ] and respect[ ] the integrity of the lawmaking process”
and recognize “the judiciary’s special role in that process.”  The first67
principle requires judicious use of presidential power out of fealty
to the legislature, including Congress’s ability to override a veto
with a super-majority. The second principle requires the President
to respect the “comparative institutional competencies” of the three
branches of government and to encourage dialogue on constitutional
meaning among the branches.  This means that the President68
should give deference to the constitutional interpretations of
Congress (when it makes them) and to the Court in light of the
comparative advantages of each respective branch. Based on a
number of different considerations,  Johnsen argues that there are69
circumstances in which presidential nondefense or non-enforcement
can be legitimate.  Ultimately, she argues that the President70
should strive to engage the judicial branch by ensuring that
controversies become justiciable, allowing the judiciary to have the
final say on constitutionality.71
67. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 47, at 29. 
68. Id. at 36 (citations omitted). 
69. Johnsen espouses a series of considerations that, in addition to constitutional
structural analyses, are determinants of good decision making regarding presidential
constitutionalism in the context of presidential non-enforcement of federal statutes. This list
includes: (1) the sharpness of the “constitutional defect;” (2) “the President[’s] ... institutional
expertise relevant to resolving the constitutional issue;” (3) whether Congress “consider[ed]
the constitutional issue in enacting the law;” (4) whether non-enforcement would affect the
likelihood of judicial review; (5) the seriousness of the harm from enforcing the law; and (6)
whether “repeal ... or nondefense of the statute” are “effective alternatives to non-
enforcement.” See id. at 53. 
70. Id. at 41-54. Johnsen discusses the clash between the President and Congress in
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), as an example of a valid exercise of presidential
nondefense. See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 47, at 50. In Lovett, the
Roosevelt Administration refused to defend a statute the President signed into law that
prohibited him from paying the salaries of three named federal employees unless they were
reappointed with advice and consent of the Senate. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 305. Congress
defended the statute and the Court ultimately agreed with the President. Johnsen argues that
presidential nondefense led to an outcome in Lovett that was more constitutionally sound and
faithful to the structure of the Constitution than through unilateral non-enforcement by the
President. See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 47, at 48-50. In the non-
enforcement context, Johnsen discusses how President Andrew Johnson’s non-enforcement
of the Tenure of Office Act increased the chances of judicial review and “the possibility of
further dialogue among the branches in the context of litigation.” Id. at 48.
71. See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 47, at 47-50.
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While the above positions assess instances of presidential
constitutionalism through the lenses of constitutional text, history,
or institutional practice, they do not consider how particular acts of
nondefense (or non-enforcement) can be grounded within a Presi-
dent’s broader commitment to a given constitutional position.
Indeed, acts of presidential constitutionalism can derive normative
force from the President’s larger vision regarding substantive
equality and individual rights, especially when a President uses the
bully pulpit, during campaigns and upon being elected, to promote
constitutional interpretation. In other words, under the right
conditions, there can be times when presidential accountability,
expertise, and access to information can support the advancement
of constitutional claims—especially regarding norms of liberty and
equality. “[I]t is certainly reasonable to say that constitutional
ambiguities should be resolved by those who are most account-
able,”  and the President’s electoral accountability, coupled with his72
access to information, can also make him more responsive to
broader shifts in constitutional culture.  In such instances,73
presidential constitutional interpretation provides an important
“source of interpretation in the absence of judicial resolution and a
valuable alternative or supplemental voice when the Court has
spoken.”  74
The use of presidential constitutionalism to advance individual
rights recognizes the role of the executive branch as an important
actor within a broader civil rights struggle while acknowledging the
need for a larger number of institutions to shape that debate at both
the state and federal levels. When done properly, presidential
constitutionalism can engage the policy realm with an interpretive
humility that acknowledges some role for executive constitutional
interpretation, while promoting additional conversation with the
equally expert coordinate branches to catalyze, rather than
72. Sunstein, supra note 55, at 2584. 
73. As Daniel Meltzer explains, some Departmentalists argue that the executive branch
is actually better equipped to interpret the Constitution than the courts because it is “less
technical and formulaic” and “better grounded in currents of political justice, popular will, and
constitutional culture.” Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1189.
74. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation:
Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 115 (2004)
[hereinafter Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism].
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pretermit, judicial determinations of the constitutional questions at
issue. The President can engage the coordinate branches in ways
that exploit, in the best possible way, his institutional role in
providing leadership, where appropriate, on matters of social
disputation.  To understand the unique importance of presidential75
constitutionalism in the civil rights context, it is useful to consider
its deployment throughout history.
II. PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AS CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT
Presidential constitutionalism enjoys a rich historical pedigree
that dates as far back as the late eighteenth century, when Presi-
dent Thomas Jefferson refused to enforce the validity of the Alien
and Sedition Acts.  Modern presidents have refused to enforce or76
defend congressional acts in a variety of contexts,  and those efforts77
have at times been part of a larger presidential commitment to
75. The breadth of the administrative state is also important. While federal courts are
capable of hearing only a limited number of cases affecting individual rights, the
administrative agencies can have a major role in interpreting the scope of those rights—not
as a substitute for the federal courts but as entities capable of filling in the spaces left open
by judicial rulings. See infra Part III.A.
76. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 53, at 514 (noting that Jefferson was “[t]he first
President to confront a law he believed unconstitutional” and he “rejected any notion that he
had to enforce and defend it”). Jefferson considered the law offensive to constitutional norms,
and he pardoned those who had been convicted under the Acts and abated all prosecutions
under the Acts, pending or prospective. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME 73 (2004); Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1189; Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1664-
66 (2008). In 1840, Congress vindicated Jefferson by repaying those who had been fined under
the Sedition Act of July 4, 1840, ch. 45, 6 Stat. 802. See STONE, supra, at 73. A number of
Supreme Court Justices subsequently described the Act as unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288-89 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.). The
Court later cited those Justices and President Jefferson’s pardons approvingly when, in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964), it explained its agreement with the
“broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of
government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.”
77. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1201 n.94 (noting various administrations’ refusals
to defend the independent counsel statute and the legislative veto); see also Kevin M. Stack,
The Story of Morrison v. Olson: The Independent Counsel and Independent Agencies in
Watergate’s Wake, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 401, 422-24 (Christopher H. Schroeder
& Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (discussing President Reagan’s undermining of the
independent counsel statute by continuing to enforce it while urging its invalidation). 
1738 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1719
principle. On some occasions, presidents have advocated new
constructions of constitutional meaning—as in the Truman Adminis-
tration’s campaign against Plessy v. Ferguson  during the run-up78
to Brown v. Board of Education.  On other occasions, presidential79
administrations have exercised independent judgment regarding the
implementation of Supreme Court rulings—as in a number of
executive branch decisions to stop enforcing statutes mandating
differential treatment on the basis of gender.  While some adminis-80
trations have sought to expand the reach of constitutional
protections, others have campaigned for their retrenchment, as in
the Reagan Administration’s efforts to restrict abortion rights after
Roe v. Wade.  Although these varying exercises of independent81
presidential interpretation raise different normative questions, they
provide a useful historical baseline for understanding the Presi-
dent’s institutional role in promoting constitutional principles on
civil rights matters—both in court and within the culture more
broadly.
A. Race
During the run-up to Brown v. Board of Education, the executive
branch contributed to the development of constitutional law by
forcefully opposing racial inequality and championing the toppling
of Plessy v. Ferguson.  The Truman Administration’s leadership in82
this particular arena was part of a larger presidential effort that
included an executive order ending racial segregation in the U.S.
military.  Subsequent presidential administrations took positions83
78. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional
Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1548 & n.39 (2004); infra Part II.A.
80. See infra Part II.B.
81. See infra Part II.E.
82. 163 U.S. 537; see Balkin, supra note 79, at 1548 & n.39.
83. President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948 to “effectively
signal[ ] the racial integration of the United States military.” Mario L. Barnes, “But Some of
[Them] Are Brave”: Identity Performance, the Military, and the Dangers of an Integration
Success Story, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 693, 694 (2007); see also Jennifer Gerarda
Brown & Ian Ayres, The Inclusive Command: Voluntary Integration of Sexual Minorities into
the U.S. Military, 103 MICH. L. REV. 150, 170 (2004) (explaining that President Truman’s
Executive Order of 1948 “officially outlaw[ed] segregation in the U.S. military”). The effort
built on previous efforts by President Roosevelt to integrate the U.S. military. See Exec. Order
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on race and equal protection by promoting or, in some cases, curbing
affirmative action measures.
The Truman Administration’s constitutional arguments in Brown
were part and parcel of a larger policy effort to eliminate racial
segregation that included integrating the U.S. military, “a ground-
breaking social-justice precedent that helped spur desegregation
efforts in other pockets of our civil, social, and political economy.”84
The military order “strongly encouraged popular acceptance of
integration prior to the Brown decision and was cited by amici in
Brown who supported desegregation.”  Indeed, those efforts likely85
“had a strong impact on the Court’s decision to hold separate-but-
equal schooling unconstitutional.”86
In the lead-up to Brown, the Truman Administration filed a brief
as part of its larger campaign against segregation in Henderson v.
United States,  a suit by an African American train passenger who87
was denied service on a railroad dining car.  The Interstate88
Commerce Commission (ICC) rejected Henderson’s claim, ruling
that the railroad’s post-litigation decision to accommodate black
passengers by reserving a separate table enclosed by a partition was
a legitimate implementation of the “separate but equal” doctrine.89
Henderson appealed the decision in federal court, suing both the
United States and the ICC. When Henderson lost before a three-
No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948); see also Nosanchuk, supra note 41, at 441 (“Both
presidents [Roosevelt and Truman] nudged the federal government closer towards the goal
of greater racial equality at a time when it was extremely difficult to move affirmative civil
rights legislation through the Congress. Only after these executive orders did Congress pass
important civil rights legislation—landmark bills to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, national origin, gender, and disability in employment, public accommodations,
housing, and education, ensuring equal opportunities to millions of Americans.”).
84. Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1066 (2013); see also,
e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1996). 
85. Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Supreme Court (of Baseball), 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 143, 161
(2011).
86. Id. at 162. 
87. Brief for the United States at 9, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (No.
25), 1949 WL 50329.
88. 339 U.S. at 816, 818-20. Whites occupied the tables conditionally reserved for black
customers, and the wait staff refused to serve Henderson even though there were open seats
at these tables. Id. at 819-20. 
89. See id. at 821-22; Waxman, supra note 46, at 1307.
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judge district court, he appealed directly to the Supreme Court.90
Although DOJ had initially defended the ICC, the Solicitor General
changed positions and supported Henderson,  filing a brief arguing91
that segregation on trains violated the Interstate Commerce Act and
that the doctrine of “separate but equal” was unconstitutional.  The92
Supreme Court sided with Henderson on narrow grounds, holding
that the railroad’s policy was in technical violation of the statute.93
Henderson is noteworthy for a number of reasons, not least that
the Truman Administration decided to confess error in a major civil
rights case.  Moreover, the Administration sought reversal not on94
narrow statutory grounds, but on the broader legal question of
segregation, asking the Court to overrule one of its precedents,
Plessy v. Ferguson.  Because at the time of Henderson federal95
statutes appeared to require segregated educational facilities, the
Truman Administration’s litigation position undermined that
legislation and the ordinary presidential duty to defend congressio-
nal acts.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately sided with Henderson,
it sidestepped the Truman Administration’s broader constitutional
argument regarding Plessy, ruling on statutory grounds instead.96
The same day Henderson was announced, the Court also decided
two cases that concerned racial segregation in universities: Sweatt
v. Painter  and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher97
Education.  In these cases, the Truman Administration also98
submitted briefs arguing that state-sponsored racial segregation
90. Waxman, supra note 46, at 1307. 
91. See Brief for the United States, supra note 87, at 40 (“[T]he legal and factual
assumptions” of Plessy “have been undermined and refuted” and the “ ‘separate but equal’
doctrine should now be overruled and discarded.”).
92. See id. at 12-13, 23-66.
93. See Henderson, 339 U.S. at 825-26.
94. See Waxman, supra note 46, at 1306-07.
95. See id. at 1307.
96. See Henderson, 339 U.S. at 818. 
97. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). In Sweatt, the Court rejected the University of Texas Law
School’s justification for refusing admission to a qualified black student on grounds that there
was an adequate, separate law school for African-American students.
98. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). In McLaurin, the Court rejected the University of Oklahoma’s
decision to admit a black student into its doctorate of education program but require that he
sit apart from his classmates in the classroom, library, and cafeteria. 
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was unconstitutional and that the Court should overrule Plessy.99
The Court found equal protection violations in both Sweatt and
McLaurin—again on narrower grounds—ruling that the black
students in both cases received an inferior education.  Four years100
later, in Brown, the Court accepted the broader argument made by
government and civil rights lawyers that “separate but equal” was
per se unconstitutional.101
Subsequent presidential administrations also advanced constitu-
tional interpretations of equal protection in the race context by
promoting various affirmative action programs. In 1965, President
Johnson signed Executive Order 11,246, which mandated that
federal contractors take affirmative action in recruitment and
promotion practices.  President Nixon enforced this executive102
order  and in 1969 also issued Executive Order 11,478, which103
required federal agencies to establish affirmative action programs
for civilian employees.  In addition, that year the Department of104
Labor set specific numeric targets for federally funded construction
projects.  While scholars disagree about the root of President105
Nixon’s enthusiasm for affirmative action,  the Executive Orders106
99. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-14, Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S.
637 (1950) (No. 34).
100. See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640-41; Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632-33.
101. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
102. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965).
103. See Comment, Scholars’ Reply to Professor Fried, 99 YALE L.J. 163, 166 (1989); see also
Michael K. Braswell, Gary A. Moore & Stephen L. Poe, Affirmative Action: An Assessment of
Its Continuing Role in Employment Discrimination Policy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 365, 369 n.16
(1993) (explaining that Johnson’s Executive Order was “later reinforced by Executive Order
11,478, issued by President Nixon in 1969”).
104. Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (Aug. 8, 1969).
105. Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 51, 69 (1996); see also Lundy R. Langston, Affirmative Action, A Look at South
Africa and the United States: A Question of Pigmentation or Leveling the Playing Field?, 13
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 333, 348 n.66 (1997). 
106. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar & Lisa F. Opoku, Recent Developments, Justice O’Connor’s
Blind Rationalization of Affirmative Action Jurisprudence—Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 225 n.11 (1996) (describing
various scholarly takes on Nixon’s support for affirmative action); J. Clay Smith, Jr., Open
Letter to the President on Race and Affirmative Action, 42 HOW. L.J. 27, 42-43 & n. 92 (1998)
(describing Nixon’s support for affirmative action and the limitations of that support).
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were major steps that advanced anti-discrimination norms in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s busing decisions.107
After the Johnson and Nixon Administrations expanded affirma-
tive action, subsequent administrations made efforts to curb it.
Presidents Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush both appointed
Supreme Court Justices who would support their agendas of
curtailing affirmative action. President Reagan appointed Justices
O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, all thought to be conservatives in
favor of President Reagan’s anti-affirmative action views.108
President Bush appointed Justices Souter and Thomas, believing
that both would cast votes against affirmative action.  The Reagan109
and Bush Administrations also made their anti-affirmative action
views known through briefs filed in landmark affirmative action
cases. For example, as Solicitor General during the Reagan
Administration, Charles Fried submitted a brief in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education arguing against a law permitting
protection against layoffs for public employees based on race or
national origin.  During the Bush Administration, DOJ filed an110
amicus brief authored by Fried in City of Richmond v. Croson, which
argued that a city ordinance requiring that at least 30 percent of
Richmond’s city contracts go to minority businesses violated equal
protection.  The Bush Administration also opposed affirmative111
action when acting Solicitor General (and current Chief Justice)
John Roberts filed a brief in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
arguing that a longstanding FCC practice granting preferences to
107. See Carl L. Livingston, Jr., Affirmative Action on Trial: The Retraction of Affirmative
Action and the Case for Its Retention, 40 HOW. L.J. 145, 149 (1996).
108. All three appointees, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, arguing that federal affirmative action programs should be
measured by the most exacting form of judicial scrutiny. 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O’Connor,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
109. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1508 (2007); Catharine Pierce Wells, Clarence
Thomas: The Invisible Man, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 121-23 (1993).
110. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10-11, Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 84-1340), 1985 WL 669739, at *8 (charact-
erizing affirmative action laws as “measures discriminating against whites”). Notably, the
brief was co-authored by then-Assistant to the Solicitor General, Samuel A. Alito, Jr. See id.
111. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 8, City of
Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (No. 87-998), 1988 WL 1025715, at *6. 
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minority-owned broadcasters violated equal protection.  While the112
Bush Administration refused to defend the policies, it did permit the
FCC to defend them.113
President Bush also vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990,  which114
he labeled a quota bill,  and he opposed (but signed) the veto-proof115
Civil Rights Act of 1991.  The day before he was scheduled to sign116
the bill, he “issued a directive terminating affirmative action in the
federal government,”  but “congressional and public outcry ... 117
forced [him] to withdraw [the directive].”  Bush signed the civil118
rights bill reluctantly, stressing in his signing statement the
limitations he believed the law placed on disparate impact doctrine
and affirmative action programs.119
B. Gender
During the 1970s, the executive branch determined that a wide
swath of federal laws were no longer constitutional in light of
Supreme Court decisions prohibiting gender discrimination. Two
cases were of particular importance. First, in Califano v. Westcott,
the Court invalidated a provision of the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program that provided benefits to families
whose dependent children lost parental support because of a father’s
unemployment, but not the mother’s.  The Court applied interme-120
diate scrutiny to the provision and invalidated it as a vestige of the
kind of “sexual stereotypes” that presumed a father’s “primary
112. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453), 1989 WL 1126975, *8.
113. See Johnsen, Defend Constitutional Equality, supra note 66, at 607. 
114. Stephen Plass, Exploring the Limits of Executive Civil Rights Policymaking, 61 OKLA.
L. REV. 155, 177 (2008).
115. See id.; see also President George H.W. Bush, Message to the Senate Returning
Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1437, 1438 (Oct. 22, 1990).
116. See Plass, supra note 114, at 178.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 178-79; see President George H.W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1504 (Nov. 21, 1991) (“It is extremely important that the
statute be properly interpreted—by executive branch officials, by the courts, and by America’s
employers—so that no incentives [exist] to engage in [ ] illegal conduct [such as adopting
quotas or racial preferences].”).
120. 443 U.S. 76, 78, 93 (1979).
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responsibility to provide a home and its essentials” and a mother’s
role in the “center of home and family life.”  Second, in Califano v.121
Goldfarb, the Court invalidated gender-based distinctions that
afforded widows and widowers different relief under Social Security
benefit programs as invidious discrimination on the basis of
gender.  At the time of these opinions, the U.S. Code contained122
numerous laws discriminating on the basis of sex, making it
unlikely, if not impossible, that the federal courts (including the
lower courts) would resolve the constitutionality of each and every
statute in which a sex-based classification was at issue.  In123
response to the early Supreme Court decisions, DOJ combed
through the U.S. Code to identify “similar gender-based rules and
instruct[ed] the Executive Branch not to follow them.”  Ultimately,124
the Attorney General stopped enforcing such a large number of
statutes that “Congress required [DOJ] to notify counsel for [the]
House and Senate when the [executive branch] decided not to
appeal from a decision holding a statute unconstitutional.”125
While presidential campaigns to promote racial equality advanced
novel constructions of operative constitutional meaning, the gender
cases generally reflected implementations of prior Court
decisions.  In one particular example, however, the Administra-126
tion’s interpretation of prior decisions likely exceeded the scope of
those earlier Supreme Court rulings. In Struck v. Secretary of
Defense,  the President decided not to enforce a federal statute that127
121. Id. at 89 (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S.
7, 10 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 n.15 (1975)).
122. 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977). These rulings were part of a larger set of Supreme Court
cases striking down various forms of gender discrimination. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 204 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a state law that set a different minimum age for
men and women when purchasing certain varieties of beer); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 690-91 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a practice of determining dependency status in
part based on sex).
123. Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1194.
124. Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 913. In some cases, the executive branch chose not to
appeal lower court rulings striking down gender-based provisions, “a step that is functionally
a final constitutional decision by the Executive Branch.” Id.
125. Id. 
126. See generally Berman, supra note 30 (analyzing the distinction between
interpretations that announce the operative meaning of the Constitution and those that
reflect mere implementation of the Constitution).
127. 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
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required the automatic military discharge of pregnant servicemem-
bers.  Captain Struck, a career officer in the Air Force who was128
facing discharge, challenged the policy and lost in both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit.  The Supreme Court granted129
certiorari, and then-Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a brief on
Struck’s behalf.  However, the case never made it to the Supreme130
Court because DOJ decided not to enforce the provision after the
Court granted certiorari. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold was
worried about the government’s chances before the Court and
recommended that the Air Force “waive Captain Struck’s discharge
and abandon its policy of automatically discharging women for
pregnancy.”  The Air Force agreed, and the Supreme Court131
vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit
“to consider the issue of mootness in light of the position presently
asserted by the Government.”132
Two years later, however, the Court rejected the premise that
pregnancy discrimination constituted per se gender discrimination.
In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court upheld California’s exclusion of
medical benefits for pregnant women in its disability insurance
program.  Applying rational basis review, the Court concluded that133
California’s refusal to cover ordinary pregnancies served a legiti-
mate purpose of keeping the fund solvent, affordable, and func-
tional.  Eventually, Geduldig was effectively overruled,  and134 135
128. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on
Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771, 777-78 (2010). 
129. Struck, 460 F.2d at 1373-74.
130. See Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178),
1972 WL 135840.
131. Siegel & Siegel, supra note 128, at 778 (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice,
Supreme Court of the United States, Advocating the Elimination of Gender-Based
Discrimination: The 1970’s New Look at the Equality Principle, Address at the University of
Cape Town, South Africa (Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_02-10-06.html).
132. Struck, 409 U.S. at 1071.
133. 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974). The Court reached a similar holding in the context of statu-
tory employment discrimination in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. 429 U.S. 125, 139-40 (1976).
134. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494-97.
135. In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983), the
Supreme Court held that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92
Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)), overruled Gilbert. Scholars have
noted that Newport News Shipbuilding significantly limited, if not functionally overturned,
Geduldig. See, e.g., Kyla Davidoff, Comment, Time to Close the Gap: Women in the Individual
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although that case is not identical to Struck, Geduldig’s outcome
suggests that the Supreme Court might have upheld Captain
Struck’s discharge had it considered the merits.
C. HIV
Another notable example at the intersection of presidential
constitutionalism and individual liberty arose in 1996 in the context
of discrimination based on HIV status. Congress was attempting to
pass the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996,
an omnibus defense appropriations bill.  Near the end of the136
legislative process, Representative Robert Dornan added an
amendment that would have required the President to discharge all
HIV-positive members of the military.  President Clinton, along137
with his team of advisors, was highly opposed to this provision and
believed it to be driven solely by malice toward HIV-positive serv-
icemembers.  Thus, Clinton vetoed the bill when it first came to138
his desk for signing.  Soon afterward, Congress passed a new139
version addressing some of Clinton’s other concerns with the bill at
large while retaining the controversial HIV provision.  Clinton now140
faced a choice: to veto the omnibus bill again, with the result that all
of its provisions would be further held up, or to pursue an alterna-
tive strategy.  Clinton decided to sign the important bill while141
publicly pressuring Congress to repeal the HIV-discharge provision
before it took effect and, if it failed to do so, enforce but not defend
Health Insurance Market Deserve Access to Maternity Coverage, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y
391, 408-409 (2010).
136. Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186 (1996).
137. Id. § 567 (repealed 1996 and codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1177 (2006)); Aziz Z.
Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1020 (2012);
Johnsen, What’s a President to Do?, supra note 66, at 415. Dornan’s amendment was based
on the misconception that HIV could be contracted only through actions that violated the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, such as “illegal drug use, homosexual activity, or sex with
prostitutes.” Id.
138. See Johnsen, Defend Constitutional Equality, supra note 66, at 608. 
139. Id. at 609; see also WILLIAM J. CLINTON, VETO MESSAGE, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-155 (1995),
reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. H12 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1996) (noting President Clinton’s
disapproval for the unwarranted discharge of servicemembers infected with HIV).
140. See Johnsen, Defend Constitutional Equality, supra note 66, at 609.
141. See id.
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the provision in the courts.  Eventually, Congress repealed the142
provision before it took effect.143
Although President Clinton believed that an equal protection
violation was clear and that the provision was “blatantly discrimina-
tory and highly punitive,”  it is unlikely that the federal courts144
would have found the law unconstitutional at that time.  Thus,145
President Clinton’s reasons for refusing to defend such a law would
likely have been based on a novel interpretation of the Constitu-
tion’s operative meaning—not an implementation of the Court’s
prior rulings. After all, while such a law might be struck down
today,  a court examining the HIV-discharge provision in 1996146
would likely have upheld it.147
142. See id.; see also Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 226, 227 (Feb. 10, 1996) [hereinafter Signing
Statement], available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=52387 (explaining
the President’s decision not to veto the bill a second time). 
143. Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. II, § 2707(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1321-330
(2006); see Johnsen, Defend Constitutional Equality, supra note 66, at 609. 
144. Signing Statement, supra note 142, at 226; see Johnsen, Presidential Non-
Enforcement, supra note 47, at 56. President Clinton’s signing statement argued that the
provision “violates equal protection by requiring the discharge of qualified service members
living with HIV who are medically able to serve, without furthering any legitimate
governmental purpose.” Signing Statement, supra note 142, at 227.
145. Johnsen, Defend Constitutional Equality, supra note 66, at 609 (noting that, in 1996,
the federal courts evaluating the HIV ban would likely “underenforce the equal protection
norms at stake under a deferential rational basis review”); Johnsen, Presidential Non-
Enforcement, supra note 47, at 55-56 & n.190 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, The Province and
Duty of the Political Departments, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 365, 382-83 (1998)). 
146. Although it is difficult to predict how a federal court would interpret such a provision
today, there have certainly been notable legislative changes that suggest a potential shift in
understanding regarding discrimination based on HIV. For example, in 2008, Congress
repealed legislation restricting HIV-positive individuals from entering the country. Tom
Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-293, § 305, 122 Stat. 2918, 2963.
Beginning in 1987, non-citizens with HIV had been made inadmissible to the United States
by regulation, see Medical Examination of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (1987) (amending 42
C.F.R. § 34.2(b)), and in 1993, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to
require the Department of Health and Human Services to designate the HIV infection a
“communicable disease of public health significance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(I)(A)(I) (2006).
Congress later repealed those restrictions, and President George W. Bush signed the bill into
law. Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-87, 123 Stat
2885; see Devin Dwyer, U.S. Bans on HIV-Positive Visitors, Immigrants Expires, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 5, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/united-states-ends-22-year-hiv-travel-
ban/story?id=9482817&singlePage=true.
147. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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D. Self-Incrimination
The Clinton Administration also championed a criminal defen-
dant’s right against self-incrimination in Dickerson v. United
States  by disputing the constitutionality of a federal law that148
nullified hallowed Miranda warnings in criminal interrogations.149
The law called for a retreat to standards of admissibility comparable
to those in place prior to the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment
against the states  in Malloy v. Hogan.  After Malloy, the Court150 151
in Miranda v. Arizona established parallel protections from the
inherently coercive nature of certain interrogation tactics that
federal officers commonly employed.  Thus was born the now-152
famous Miranda warnings, requiring that the accused be informed
of their rights prior to interrogation and that the state fully honor
those rights.  Though such warnings are prophylactic in nature,153 154
148. 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2006)).
149. Id. at 431-36.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2006). For an overview of the standards of admissibility of
confessions prior to the Fifth Amendment’s incorporation against the states, see Laurence A.
Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical
Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 113-17 (1989). 
151. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Before individuals enjoyed Fifth Amendment protections from the
individual states, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provided defendants some
protection against self-incrimination. See Benner, supra note 150, at 113-17 (discussing the
development of protections against self-incrimination as applied within the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court first began to outline those
protections in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), which held that a confession was
inadmissible when it was obtained through the use of physical force. Id. at 285-86. In the
ensuing decades, the Court fleshed out the requirement that confessions were only admissible
if they were in fact “voluntary,” see Benner, supra note 150, at 113-17, which required an
inquiry into the “totality of all the circumstances” of the interrogation. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223, 226 (1973) (“In some 30 different cases decided [in the 28
years following Brown], the Court was faced with the necessity of determining whether in fact
the confessions in issue had been ‘voluntarily’ given.” (citations omitted)).
152. 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (“Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice.”).
153. Id. at 467.
154. See Berman, supra note 30, at 18-43 (discussing Miranda and the debate over
prophylactic rules).
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Miranda has been understood to “safeguard[ ] a ‘fundamental trial
right.’ ”155
Unhappy with the Miranda decision, Congress sought to undo it
through legislation that made voluntary confessions admissible in
prosecutions by the United States or the District of Columbia.  The156
language of the statute closely tracked that of the pre-Miranda
standards, and did so by design.  Consequently, the executive was157
thus placed between Congress and the Court when the constitution-
ality of § 3501 was challenged in Dickerson. It could either defend
a law designed to conflict with the Court’s jurisprudence, and thus
argue that the Court overrule itself, or it could argue for the Court
to affirm Miranda and thus strike down the congressional act.158
While the perspectives of different presidential administrations on
that question had varied,  the executive chose, at the time of the159
Dickerson challenge, to argue that the Court should affirm
Miranda.160
Seth Waxman, the Solicitor General at the time, subsequently
explained that the executive viewed the decision to challenge the
155. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)). 
156. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2006).
157. The senator introducing the bill to the Senate floor described it as an attempt to
“rectify” the Miranda Court’s “mockery of justice.” 113 CONG. REC. 1582, 1583 (1967)
(statement of Sen. John McClellan). The original bill’s Senate Committee Report likewise
criticized Miranda and described a need to return to the pre-Miranda test courts had used to
determine voluntariness. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 46-50 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2132-38.
158. The executive ultimately rejected a potential middle-ground argument—accepted by
the Fourth Circuit, which set the stage for Supreme Court review—that because Miranda
warnings are prophylactic, they are actually merely rules of procedure. On such a reading,
Congress could overrule the Court without requiring the Court to overrule itself, as the
decision was not a constitutional one. The Court’s own reasoning in Miranda and its
subsequent applications make clear that the ruling was indeed constitutional and not merely
procedural. See Brief for the United States at 21-29, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000) (No. 99-5525), 2000 WL 141075, at *12-15. 
159. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional
Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 387-90 (2003)
[hereinafter Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court] (noting practice within the
Meese DOJ to advance constitutional interpretations at odds with a range of Supreme Court
decisions, including Miranda).
160. See Brief for the United States at 29-50, Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (No. 99-5525), 2000
WL 141075, at *15-21.
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law as a “solemn act.”  The President came to the decision after161
careful deliberation with Waxman and the Attorney General about
the policy implications of the impending decision, as well as
jurisprudential concerns such as stare decisis.  The President’s162
decision was informed by the fact that, because the decision would
be a constitutional one, it would necessarily affect fundamental
rights.163
The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the executive.164
Indeed, the Court noted that it is jurisdictionally incapable of
applying rules to state courts—as it did in Miranda and in subse-
quent cases —unless it is to apply the Constitution.  The Court165 166
drew on language from Miranda to further establish the constitu-
tional character of the issue, describing the need “to give concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to
follow.”  Accordingly, the Supreme Court, like the executive in its167
brief, rejected the idea that it could uphold § 3501 without overturn-
ing Miranda.  It declined to do so, and struck down the law.168 169
E. Abortion
Presidential administrations have also been involved in cam-
paigns to shape interpretations of reproductive rights.  In the170
period between the Supreme Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade  and171
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,172
presidential administrations advanced independent constitutional
161. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1087-88 (2001).
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
165. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (interpreting Miranda).
166. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438-39 (“With respect to proceedings in state courts, our
authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution.”) (citations
and quotations omitted).
167. Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966)).
168. See id. at 436-37, 444.
169. Id. at 444.
170. See NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE 97-120 (1996); Johnsen, Functional
Departmentalism, supra note 74, at 134-47.
171. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
172. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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interpretations by raising the issue during campaigns and, once in
office, reiterating them through use of the bully pulpit;  supporting173
and signing legislation that comported with the executive’s policy
preferences, or, alternatively, vetoing legislation that did not;174
considering views on reproductive liberty when making judicial
appointments;  nominating to executive posts individuals who175
shared the President’s view;  filing amicus briefs in court;  and176 177
pursuing regulatory initiatives that advanced the executive’s
agenda on reproductive rights.178
President Reagan was especially active in this regard. As early as
1983, his Administration urged the Court to scale back Roe. In
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,  Reagan’s179
Solicitor General, Rex Lee, filed a brief urging the adoption of an
“undue burden” standard of review, which would be less stringent
than Roe’s fundamental right/strict scrutiny standard.  Lee’s180
replacement, Charles Fried, filed a brief in 1986 explicitly asking
the Court to overturn Roe.  DOJ likewise filed amicus briefs in181
173. For example, Richard Nixon described abortion as “an unacceptable form of population
control” during the 1972 election. See DEVINS, supra note 170, at 98. Ronald Reagan’s 1980
campaign included support for “a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right
to life for unborn children.” Id. at 100. George H.W. Bush expressed a desire to stop “another
unborn child” from becoming “the innocent victim of abortion.” Id. at 101.
174. President George H.W. Bush used his veto power to prevent, inter alia, congressional
overrides of Reagan-era regulations restricting funding to international and domestic family-
planning centers that provided abortion counseling, as well as a moratorium on fetal tissue
research. See id. at 102-03. After Casey, President Clinton vetoed a ban on “partial birth
abortions,” whereas President George W. Bush signed a similar ban into law. See Johnsen,
Functional Departmentalism, supra note 74, at 141. 
175. For example, President Reagan’s Administration established a Judicial Selection
Committee for screening potential nominees based on their ideological leanings. This
appearance of support for reproductive choice was potentially fatal for the candidate’s
chances. See DEVINS, supra note 170, at 105. 
176. See id. at 107-08 (detailing numerous Reagan appointees who “came from the right-to-
life movement,” and describing how “the [H.W.] Bush and Clinton administrations ... followed
the Reagan model”).
177. See id. at 109-11; Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism, supra note 74, at 137, 141-42.
178. See DEVINS, supra note 170, at 113-17 (describing, inter alia, the Reagan
Administration’s funding restrictions for clinics that provided abortion-counseling and, post-
Casey, the Clinton Administration’s dissolution of those Reagan-era regulations).
179. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
180. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1982) (No. 81-746); see Johnsen, Functional
Departmentalism, supra note 74, at 137.
181. See DEVINS, supra note 170, at 110-11. 
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several state-level actions to stimulate discussion on the subject in
the hopes of eventually overruling Roe.  These wide-ranging efforts182
from Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush were reflected in
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In Casey,  the joint opinion183
authored by Reagan- and Bush-appointed Justices adopted the
“undue burden”  standard that Solicitor General Lee had urged a184
decade earlier.  Although Casey did not overturn Roe entirely, it185
did scale back the standard of review, diluting protections for
reproductive rights.186
F. Guns
Since the 1980s, presidential administrations have used constitu-
tional interpretations to lay the groundwork for, and ultimately
realize, an interpretation of the Second Amendment providing for
an individual right to bear arms. An early example of that effort
took place in 1984, when President Ronald Reagan remarked at a
campaign rally “that law-abiding people who want to protect their
home and family have a constitutional right to own guns.”  Under187
the direction of Attorney General Edwin Meese, the Reagan
Administration championed the rights of individuals to keep and
bear arms under the Second Amendment as well as a number of
other traditionally conservative causes.  Through DOJ directives,188
182. Id. at 110.
183. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
184. Id. at 877.
185. See Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism, supra note 74, at 137.
186. Johnsen and Devins disagree on whether Casey reduced the salience of abortion as a
political issue, leading to more subdued executive action. Devins suggests that the political
branches respected the legitimacy of the Casey decision, which tempered the salience of
abortion as a political issue. See DEVINS, supra note 170, at 119-20 (“With the Supreme Court
carving out a middle-ground position on abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the White
House has little to gain by staking out a hard-line position on abortion.”) Johnsen, however,
draws attention to a number of problems with the restrictions the Court has upheld,
indicating that the issue remains live. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism, supra note 74,
at 135 n.118.
187. Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Mesquite, Texas, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1461,
1463 (Nov. 5, 1988); see also Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 222 (2008) (discussing the executive’s
efforts to promote individual constitutional rights under the Second Amendment).
188. See Siegel, supra note 187, at 221-22; see also Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the
Rehnquist Court, supra note 159, at 387-91.
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as well as a strategy to carefully select judicial appointees who were
partial to the administration’s view of the Second Amendment,189
President Reagan helped to lay a groundwork that was later
advanced through the concerted efforts of President George W.
Bush, whose Administration successfully promoted the expansion
of an individual right to bear arms  that paved the way  for the190 191
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.192
While prior administrations took differing approaches to Second
Amendment interpretations,  the Bush Administration waged a193
push for an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amend-
ment in May 2001 when then-Attorney General John Ashcroft wrote
a letter to the National Rifle Association of America indicating that
the Bush Administration might support such an interpretation of
the Second Amendment.  The move represented a marked shift194
from that of prior administrations.  During the lead up to Heller,195
189. Siegel, supra note 187, at 220.
190. GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND
THE LAW 126-27 (Gregg Lee Carter ed., 2d ed. 2012). Among the more notable efforts to
liberalize gun rights by President Bush are (1) his “deflect[ion of] calls to implement a
nationwide ballistic fingerprinting system” during the search for the D.C. sniper in 2002; (2)
his focus on the passage of a “federal law that would indemnify gun manufacturers and sellers
from lawsuits,” which was passed in 2005; and (3) his failure to pressure House Republicans
to reinstate the expiring Federal Assault Weapons Ban in 2004, despite public support for the
ban and campaign promises to renew it. Id. However, in 2008 Bush did sign into law the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System Improvement Act after public calls and
“bipartisan [support for] legislation aimed at preventing the mentally ill from purchasing
guns” emerged in the wake of the deadly 2007 shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University. Id. at 127; see also Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law, Policy, and Politics, 84 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 35, 36 (2012) (“The second Bush presidency proved itself to be, in policy terms, the
most gun-friendly presidency in history.... What is remarkable about Bush and gun control
... is the extent to which the administration put itself out, not only in its political stands on
the issue but in the administration’s policy toward law-related matters pertaining to the gun
issue, where the administration adhered to the NRA line with near-total devotion.”).
191. See GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 190, at 126-27.
192. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
193. See Memorandum from the Attorney General to All United States’ Attorneys,
Regarding United States v. Emerson 1, 2, 6 (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.justice.
gov/olc/secondamendment2.pdf. Prior to the Bush Administration’s novel interpretations, DOJ
had generally interpreted the amendment narrowly, “opposing efforts to create an individual
right to acquire and possess firearms for private use.” Mathew S. Nosanchuk, The
Embarrassing Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 705, 707 (2002).
194. Nosanchuk, supra note 193, at 707-08.
195. See id. at 710 (noting that the letter represented a “dramatic departure from past
policy” and “flatly contradicted the Department’s concurrent position in pending litigation”);
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lawyers began citing the Bush Administration’s stance on the
Second Amendment as a basis to dismiss weapons charges against
their clients  and to “assert[ ] Second Amendment defenses to gun196
charges.”197
Bush’s gun rights record proved to be an asset in his 2004
reelection campaign;  after winning reelection, he appointed John198
Roberts and Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court, both of whom
proved important in securing the Second Amendment interpretation
the Bush Administration favored.  In District of Columbia v.199
Heller, the Court adopted the individual rights interpretation and
struck down a gun regulation for the first time.200
id. (“This dissonance between the Letter and the Department’s longstanding policy and
litigation positions, the substantive flaws in the Letter, and the process by which the Letter
was produced suggest that Attorney General Ashcroft was acting to legitimize a pro-gun
canon when he wrote to the NRA, not institutionalizing the policy agenda of the President
through legitimate means.”) (citations omitted); see also Spitzer, supra note 190, at 36-37
(“The letter was remarkable for several reasons: (1) it represented an offhanded, informal, and
political means to articulate and inaugurate what proved to be an abrupt and total about-face
in decades of Justice Department policy on the meaning of the Second Amendment; (2) the
letter’s arguments contradicted more than a century of federal court rulings that had
uniformly rejected the view embraced by Ashcroft; (3) the evidence and sources cited in the
letter to support Ashcroft’s claim did no such thing; and (4) the letter failed to cite the most
important sources explaining what the right to bear arms does mean. Yet it represented the
initial political and legal charge to reinterpret the Second Amendment—an effort that met
with success in 2008.”) (citations omitted).
196. Margaret E. Sprunger, Comment, D.C. as a Breeding Ground for the Next Second
Amendment Test Case: The Conflict Within the U.S. Attorney’s Office, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 577,
577 n.2 (2004).
197. Clark Neily, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Is Back, Baby,
2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 127, 134.
198. See David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L.
REV. DE NOVO 99, 130 (“In 2004, John Kerry came closer to defeating an incumbent President
in wartime than had any candidate since DeWitt Clinton in 1812. As with Gore, Kerry’s
Second Amendment record cost him the Presidency.”). Shortly before the 2004 Presidential
election, DOJ reaffirmed its individual rights interpretation in an opinion from the Office of
Legal Counsel. See John Zulkey, The Obsolete Second Amendment: How Advances in Arms
Technology Have Made the Prefatory Clause Incompatible with Public Policy, 2010 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 213, 219. 
199. See Kopel, supra note 198, at 130; see also David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War
of the Twentieth Century—and Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527,
1605 (2012) (“That President Bush, rather than President Kerry, appointed the Justices to
replace William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor turned out to make all the difference
a few years later in Heller.”). 
200. 554 U.S. 570, 581, 635 (2008); see Spitzer, supra note 190, at 37.
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In Heller, Bush’s Solicitor General Paul Clement supplied an
amicus brief that advocated for a Second Amendment right to bear
arms.  The Clement brief also put DOJ in the somewhat awkward201
position of questioning a federal statute in the form of a District of
Columbia gun-control measure.  In the end, Heller represented a202
huge victory for the Bush Administration that has proved to be
quite durable; during the 2008 election, both presidential candidates
eagerly declared their support for the Heller decision.  In 2010, the203
Supreme Court reaffirmed its interpretation of the individual right
to bear arms by applying the rule against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Heller exemplifies204
how the Bush Administration capitalized on a vibrant social
movement and academic writing  to mount a successful campaign205
that implemented a vision of the Second Amendment right that
shifted dramatically from prior administrations.
III. PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GAY RIGHTS
Barack Obama, for his part, has been a staunch supporter of the
rights of LGBT individuals and same-sex couples. Among his
various efforts to promote LGBT equality, Obama’s refusal to defend
DOMA represents one of the more controversial policy decisions of
his first term. While the Obama Administration originally defended
DOMA in the handful of suits it inherited from the second Bush
Administration,  it changed course shortly after Windsor was filed206
201. See Neily, supra note 197, at 145 (noting, however, that Clement’s brief maintained
that the individual right to bear arms is still subject to “reasonable regulation,” which may
have come as a disappointment to those in the Bush Administration who sought even stricter
protections of Second Amendment rights). 
202. See Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1206-07 (questioning “the appropriateness of the
Department of Justice’s taking a position in an amicus brief that would call into question the
validity of one or more federal statutes”).
203. See Kopel, supra note 198, at 132. 
204. See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010); see also Spitzer, supra note
190, at 38. 
205. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 688 (2009) (noting, during
the 1980s, “an explosion in the number of academic arguments addressing the Second
Amendment generally and advocating the individual rights view specifically”). 
206. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, Gill
v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 109-CV-10309-JLT).
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in district court, announcing on February 23, 2011  that it would207
no longer defend the constitutionality of the statute based on its
conclusion that the federal courts should accord heightened scrutiny
to all laws facially discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation.  The Administration would continue to enforce the208
statute unless it were legislatively repealed or “the judicial branch
render[ed] a definitive verdict against the law’s constitutionality,”
but it would not defend it in court.  This enforce-but-not-defend209
policy was one of the hallmarks of Barack Obama’s commitment to
the rights of same-sex couples.
President Obama’s nondefense of DOMA was part and parcel of
a years-long campaign to advance LGBT rights in which he often
personally championed equality for same-sex couples. His commit-
ment to this principle included not only refusing to defend DOMA,
but also supporting and signing legislation,  pursuing regulatory210
207. See Holder Letter, supra note 25.
208. One reason for the apparent shift was that, although all of the litigation had
previously been filed in judicial circuits that had explicitly ruled against applying any form
of heightened judicial scrutiny to laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation,
Windsor, and a second case, Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn.
2012), were filed in judicial districts within the Second Circuit, which had yet to rule on the
question of heightened scrutiny. Those cases therefore provided the Administration with an
opportunity to argue the threshold constitutional question as well as the discrete issue
regarding DOMA’s constitutionality. See Holder Letter, supra note 25. On October 18, 2012,
the Second Circuit ruled that heightened scrutiny applied to all sexual-orientation-based
classifications and that DOMA Section 3 did not satisfy that standard of review. Windsor v.
United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181-88 (2d Cir. 2012). This was the first time a federal appeals
court applied heightened scrutiny to the issue of gay rights.
209. Holder Letter, supra note 25.
210. President Obama has signed three major pieces of legislation affecting gay rights: (1)
the repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010); (2) the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835, 2839 (2009) (codified in scattered
sections at 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.), which expanded hate-crimes protections to
victims of crimes motivated by gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability; and (3) the
Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-87, 123 Stat. 2885,
2888 (2009) (codified in scattered sections at 42 U.S.C.), which extended the Ryan White
Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576
(1990), through the 2013 fiscal year and authorized a 5 percent increase in federal funding for
the Ryan White programs. In addition to the measures he signed into law, the President
pressed Congress for employment non-discrimination legislation, legislation prohibiting LGBT
discrimination in public schools, and DOMA repeal. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 2011, S. 811, 112th Cong.; Student Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 998, 112th Cong.;
Respect for Marriage Act of 2011, S. 598, 112th Cong.; H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. 
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initiatives,  filing complaints and other court papers,  making211 212
formal and informal choices in law enforcement,  and using the213
bully pulpit to sway public opinion.  These acts, considered as a214
whole, reflect ways that the executive engaged the judiciary in a
dialogue about constitutional interpretation and legal change that
neither branch was likely to bring about on its own.
A. Gay Rights and Administrative Law
For years, DOMA prevented the federal government from
granting marriage-based benefits to married same-sex couples.
However, the Obama Administration—by interpreting laws other
than DOMA—expanded relationship benefits to married and
unmarried same-sex couples in employment, housing, health care,
and immigration.  Through a series of presidential memoranda,215 216
the federal government extended employment-based benefits to the
same-sex domestic partners of federal employees (and in some cases
to the children of those partners)  and to the same-sex domestic217
partners of foreign-service employees.  The Administration also218
211. See infra Part III.A.
212. See infra Part III.B.
213. See infra Part III.C.
214. See infra Part III.D.
215. See Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing
Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 624-27 (2012).
216. See Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies on Extension of Benefits to Same-Sex Domestic Partners of
Federal Employees, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,247, 32,247-48 (June 2, 2010) [hereinafter Memorandum
on Extension of Benefits]; Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies on Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, 74 Fed.
Reg. 29,393 (June 17, 2009); Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Secretary
of Health and Human Services on Respecting the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive
Visitors and to Designate Surrogate Decision Makers for Medical Emergencies, 75 Fed. Reg.
20,511, 20,511-12 (Apr. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Memorandum on Respecting the Rights]. 
217. See Memorandum on Extension of Benefits, supra note 216, at 32,247. The
memorandum states that: (1) the children of same-sex partners fall within the definition of
“child” for federal child care subsidies; (2) same-sex domestic partners qualify as “family
members” under employee assistance programs and other programs; (3) a same-sex partner
of a federal retiree can receive annuities upon the death of the federal retiree; (4) employees’
same-sex partners and children are dependents for purposes of evacuation payments; and (5)
federal employees can receive unpaid leave in order to meet the needs of their same-sex
partners or the children of their same-sex partner. See id. at 32,247-48.
218. See Press Release, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Benefits for Same-Sex
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enhanced hospital visitation rights for same-sex couples,  broad-219
ened its interpretation of the Violence Against Women Act to
include victims of same-sex gender-motivated violence,  expanded220
Family Medical Leave Act protections to the children of an em-
ployee’s same-sex partner,  and enlarged fair housing protections221
to prohibit sexual-orientation-based discrimination.222
Domestic Partners of Foreign Service Employees (June 18, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/06/125083.htm. The Department
of State implemented this policy by changing the Foreign Affairs Manual—followed by U.S.
consulates around the world—so that same-sex domestic partners would qualify as “eligible
family members” with respect to benefits and allowances. See U.S. Dep’t of State, 14 Foreign
Affairs Manual § 511.3 (2013).
219. See Memorandum on Respecting the Rights, supra note 216, at 20,511-12; see also
Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Changes to the Hospital and Critical Access Hospital
Conditions of Participation to Ensure Visitation Rights for All Patients, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,831,
70,831-32 (Nov. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 482, 485). 
220. See Whether the Criminal Provisions of the Violence Against Women Act Apply to
Otherwise Covered Conduct When the Offender and the Victim are the Same Sex, 34 Op.
O.L.C. 1, 3-7 (2010); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4,
127 Stat. 54 (2013).
221. See Letter from Nancy J. Leppink, Deputy Adm’r, Dep’t of Labor, Administrator’s
Interpretation No. 2010-3 (June 22, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/
adminIntrprtn/FMLA/2010/FMLAAI2010_3.htm; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Labor, U.S.
Department of Labor Clarifies FMLA Definition of ‘Son and Daughter’ (June 22, 2010),
available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/WHD/WHD20100877.htm.
222. See Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or
Gender Identity, 77 Fed. Reg. 5662, 5663, 5666 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts.
5, 200, 203, 236, 400, 570, 574, 882, 891, 982). The rule requires owners and operators of
HUD-assisted facilities to make housing available without regard to sexual orientation or
gender identity; prohibits lenders from using sexual orientation or gender identity as a basis
to determine a borrower’s eligibility for FHA-insured mortgage financing; and clarifies that
all otherwise eligible families cannot be excluded from participating in HUD programs. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., HUD Secretary Donovan Announces New
Regulations to Ensure Equal Access to Housing for All Americans Regardless of Sexual
Orientation or Gender Identity (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2012/HUDNo.12-014; see also HUD
Announces New LGBT Regulations, HOUS. AGENT MAG. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://houstonagent
magazine.com/hud-announces-new-lgbt-regulations/. The announced rule followed a January
24, 2011 proposed rule, which cited evidence that LGBT individuals and families were
unfairly and arbitrarily excluded from housing opportunities in the private sector. See Equal
Access to Housing in HUD Programs—Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity,
76 Fed. Reg. 4194, 4194-97 (proposed Jan. 24, 2011). HUD continues to demonstrate its
commitment to equal housing access for same-sex couples: in response to a recent study
released by HUD showing that same-sex couples still experience unequal treatment more
frequently than heterosexual couples when responding to rental advertisements, HUD
Secretary Shaun Donovan remarked, “Following the president’s lead, HUD has taken historic
steps in the area of fair housing to ensure that we fulfill our nation’s commitment to equality.
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In the immigration context, the Obama Administration adopted
new rules allowing couples returning from overseas travel to file a
single customs declaration form  and facilitated the process of223
extending the immigration status of the same-sex partners accom-
panying nonimmigrants  to the United States.  The Obama224 225
Administration also reversed a previous Bush Administration policy
regarding the compilation of Census data that refused to recognize
the existence of married same-sex couples. Under the former policy,
the Bush Administration would “edit” responses to Census survey
questions by changing the designation in which a respondent
indicated a same-sex husband or wife living within the same
household from “married” to “unmarried partners” instead.226
As this study shows, we need to continue our efforts to ensure that everyone is treated the
same when it comes to finding a home to call their own, regardless of their sexual
orientation.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev., HUD Announces First-Ever
Same-Sex Housing Discrimination Study (June 18, 2013), available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2013/H
UDNo.13-096.
223. On March 27, 2012, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, a division of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), announced that it would broaden the definition of family to
include “two adult individuals in a committed relationship wherein the partners share
financial assets and obligations, and are not married to, or a partner of, anyone else,
including, but not limited to, long-time companions, and couples in civil unions or domestic
partnerships.” Members of a Family for Purpose of Filing a CBP Family Declaration, 77 Fed.
Reg. 18,143, 18,144 (proposed Mar. 27, 2012). The proposed change was intended to “more
accurately reflect relationships among members of the public who are traveling together as
a family.” Id.
224. A “nonimmigrant” is a foreign national who comes to the United States for a
temporary period and for a specific purpose, such as a foreign government official, student,
or temporary worker. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012).
225. Although applicants were able to seek extensions in increments of six months from
DHS for as long as the principal continued to maintain his or her nonimmigrant status, see
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(b)(1) (2011), such extensions were often difficult to obtain. Beginning in 2011,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services issued a memorandum advising immigration
enforcers to consider a nonimmigrant’s cohabitating partnership as a “favorable factor” when
granting extensions of the visitor’s status. See Policy Memorandum, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Servs., Dep’t Homeland Sec., Changes to B-2 Status and Extensions of B-2
Status for Cohabitating Partners and Other Nonimmigrant Household Members (Aug. 7,
2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2011/August/Cohabitating_
Partners_PM_081711.pdf (“When evaluating an application for change to or extension of B-2
status based on cohabitation, the cohabitating partner’s relationship to the nonimmigrant
principal alien in another status will be considered a favorable factor in allowing the
household member to obtain or remain eligible for B-2 classification.”).
226. Memorandum from Cameron F. Kerry, Gen. Counsel of the United States Dep’t of
Commerce, to the Sec’y on Collecting and Reporting Census Data Relating to Same-Sex
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The Obama Administration initiated a series of additional
developments for LGBT individuals including prohibiting job
discrimination based on gender identity throughout the federal
government;  interpreting the gender-based employment discrimi-227
nation protections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to apply to
transgender individuals;  permitting military chaplains to officiate228
at same-sex weddings in states that recognize the right of same-sex
couples to marry;  and adding an LGBT representative to the229
diversity program at each of the 120 prisons the Federal Bureau of
Prisons operates.230
President Obama also took quick action after Windsor by
directing his Cabinet “to review all relevant federal statutes” and
implement the decision “swiftly and smoothly.”  Shortly after the231
ruling, federal agencies announced that same-sex married
Marriages (July 30, 2009), available at http://hunterofjustice.com/files/census-gc-doma-
memo.pdf. Under an earlier 1990 policy, the Census Bureau’s practice had been to change the
designated sex of the individual described as “husband or wife” of a respondent “to reflect the
opposite sex from that of the respondent.” See id. The new policy will not go into effect until
the 2020 Census, however. See, e.g., Census Will Not Count Married Gays Until 2020, GAY
POLITICS (Oct. 23, 2009), http://gaypolitics.com/2009/10/23/census-will-not-count-married-
gays-until-2020/ (noting the Census Bureau press release).
227. See OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., GUIDANCE REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF
TR A N S G E N D E R  IN D I V I D U A L S  I N  T H E  FE D E R A L  WO R K P L A C E, available at
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/diversity-and-inclusion/reference-materials/gender-
identity-guidance/; see also Press Release, ACLU, Administration Adds Gender Identity to
Equal Employment Opportunity Policies (Jan. 5, 2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-
rights/administration-adds-gender-identity-equal-employment-opportunity-policies. This
addition brings the federal government in line with many state and private employer policies
banning discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation. See, e.g., Non-
Discrimination Laws: State by State Information-Map, ACLU (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.
aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map. 
228. See Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012)
(extending Title VII to cover gender identity, change of sex, and transgender status).
229. Military Chaplains Now Allowed to Perform Same-Sex Marriages, NBCNEWS.COM
(Sept. 30, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44730793/ns/politics/t/military-chap
lains-now-allowed-perform-same-sex-marriages/#.Uh-Lhz_3Pdc.
230. Trudy Ring, Federal Prisons to Address LGBT Employees’ Concerns, ADVOCATE.COM
(May 3, 2012, 9:36 PM), http://www.advocate.com/society/2012/05/03/lgbt-prison-employees-
get-representation. The new addition is meant to ensure that LGBT employees of federal
prisons receive adequate support, and each participating prison facility will host one staff
event per year that focuses on LGBT issues. See id.
231. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Supreme
Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act (June 26, 2013), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/doma-statement.
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couples—irrespective of domicile—would receive the same federal
benefits as different-sex couples in the processing of tax, Social
Security, military, and other federal benefits.  Months after232
Windsor, the Obama Administration issued a broad memorandum
extending the ruling to a number of additional contexts including
bankruptcy law, prison visitations, and various benefits programs
such as the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund.  The233
President also refused to enforce two provisions of federal law after
Windsor that prevented veterans in same-sex relationships, as well
as some similarly situated active-duty servicemembers and reserve
members, from receiving certain benefits.234
B. Gay Rights Litigation
In the DOMA litigation, the Obama Administration advanced
powerful arguments supporting heightened scrutiny that docu-
mented a history of governmental discrimination against LGBT
persons.  Outside the DOMA context, the Obama Administration235
intervened in a number of anti-bullying lawsuits brought by private
individuals against public school districts, including one case
against Minnesota’s Anoka-Hennepin School District for frequent
acts of harassment against gender-non-conforming students.  DOJ236
232. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 (IRS ruling using the place of
celebration rule for income, estate, and gift tax); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney
General Holder Announces Move to Extend Veterans Benefits to Same-Sex Married Couples
(Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/September/13-ag-991.html;
Press Release, Dep’t of Defense, Further Guidance on Extending Benefits to Same-Sex
Spouses of Military Members (Aug. 13, 2013), available at http://www.defense.gov/home/
features/2013/docs/Further-Guidance-on-Extending-Benefits-to-Same-Sex-Spouses-of-
Military-M.pdf; Press Release, Carolyn W. Colvin, Comm’r of Social Security, Statement of
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, on Payments to Same-Sex Coup-
les (Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/pr/doma-statement-pr.html.
233. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to All Dep’t Emp., Department
Policy on Ensuring Equal Treatment for Same-Sex Married Couples (Feb. 10, 2014), available
at www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ss-married-couples-ag-memo.pdf.
234. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S.
House of Representatives (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
557201394151530910116.pdf.
235. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
236. See Complaint-in-Intervention at 21-22, Doe v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11,
No. 0:11-cv-01999-JNE-SER (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2012), ECF No. 67, available at http://www.
justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/anokacompint.pdf.
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also intervened in a lawsuit against the Mohawk Central School
District for failing to prevent in-school incidents of gender-based
bullying.  In another case, the Obama Administration reached a237
settlement agreement with the Tehachapi Unified School District in
Tehachapi, California, to resolve an investigation into acts of
harassment against a gender-non-conforming middle-school student
who committed suicide after being subjected to repeated incidents
of sex-based harassment.238
In the fair housing context,  the Obama Administration entered239
into a settlement agreement with Bank of America to resolve a
claim that the bank had denied financing to a Florida couple based
on sexual orientation and marital status.  The Administration240
also settled a dispute by agreeing to issue full severance pay to
servicemembers discharged under the now-repealed Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell law.241
237. See Memorandum of Law in Support of the United States’ Motion to Intervene at 1,
3, J.L v. Mohawk Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 6:09-CV-943 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2010), ECF No. 32,
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/mohawkmotion.pdf. Shortly after
DOJ sought to intervene, the federal government, the school district, and the plaintiff reached
a settlement agreement requiring the school district to undertake major initiatives to monitor
and prevent gender-based harassment. See Stipulation and Settlement Agreement at 2-4, J.L.
v. Mohawk Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 6:09-CV-943 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010), ECF No. 34, available
at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/mohawksettle.pdf.
238. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Departments of Justice and Education Reach
Agreement with Tehachapi, California, Public School to Resolve Harassment Allegations (July
1, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-crt-872.html. The terms of
the agreement require the Tehachapi school district to take various steps “to prevent sexual
and gender-based harassment at all of its schools, to respond appropriately to harassment
that occurs and to eliminate the hostile environment resulting from harassment.” Id. 
239. See also supra notes 215, 222 and accompanying text.
240. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev., HUD Announces Agreement
with Bank of America to Settle LGBT Discrimination Claim (Jan. 2, 2013), available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2013/H
UDNo.13-001. The settlement required Bank of America to pay $7500 to HUD; notify its
residential mortgage loan originators, processors, and underwriters of the settlement; remind
its employees that they are “prohibited from discriminating against FHA-loan applicants on
the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity or marital status;” and “update its fair lending
training program to include information on HUD’s rule.” Id.
241. See Settlement Agreement at 2, Collins v. United States, No. 10-778C (Fed. Cl. Jan.
7, 2013), ECF No. 75, available at https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/collins-v-united-states-
settlement-agreement (“Plaintiffs have agreed to settle this case in exchange for payment by
the United States of one-hundred percent of the one-half separation pay sought by the class,
subject to any offsets and excluding interest.”).
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C. Law Enforcement Discretion
Both before and after Windsor, the Obama Administration
exercised its discretion in law enforcement to improve the lives of
LGBT individuals and same-sex couples. The Administration used
prosecutorial discretion in immigration to protect the foreign-born
partners and spouses of U.S. citizens from facing removal from the
United States. In one notable case, the Attorney General issued a
precedential ruling  that had important cascading effects for many242
other foreign nationals in similar situations, resulting in the
postponement (and, eventually, termination) of removal proceedings
against many who, prior to Windsor, had no opportunity for a
family-based immigration benefit and no other way of stopping their
deportations.  In October 2012, the Obama Administration also243
issued guidance directing immigration field officers to consider
granting favorable exercises of prosecutorial discretion to the
foreign-national partners and spouses of U.S. citizens.  Shortly244
after Windsor, Secretary Napolitano announced that the immigra-
tion agencies would begin to process permanent residency applica-
tions without delay.  Within two days of the ruling, the press was245
already reporting that green cards had been granted to foreign
national spouses of U.S. citizens, including in states that do not
recognize the freedom of those couples to marry.  These actions246
were reflective of the Obama Administration’s general commitment
to implement Windsor swiftly and speedily.
242. See Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485, 485 (A.G. 2011). 
243. See Landau, supra note 215, at 640.
244. See Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, and James Dinkins, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Chief Counsel, and All Special Agents in Charge
(Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2012/10/9-Oct-12-
PD-and-Family-Reltionships.pdf.
245. Press Release, Janet Napolitano, Former Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act (July 1,
2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/07/01/statement-secretary-homeland-
security-janet-napolitano-implementation-supreme-court.
246. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Gay Married Man in Florida is Approved for Green Card, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2013, at A11.
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D. Support for the Freedom to Marry
Barack Obama is the first sitting President to announce support
for the right of same-sex couples to marry.  The President made247
the announcement during an interview with ABC News on May 9,
2012.  Although some viewed Obama’s stance as potentially248
endangering his 2012 reelection bid, his position appeared to aid
his electoral victory while also galvanizing support for same-sex
marriage from important constituencies.  His announcement249
further paved the way for successful initiative processes that year
in Maine, Maryland, and Washington  as well as successful250
legislative efforts in Delaware, Minnesota, and Rhode Island  and,251
in the wake of Windsor, additional legislative and judicial develop-
ments in Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and New Mexico.  The252
247. See Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Endorses Same-Sex Marriage, Taking Stand
on Charged Social Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A1.
248. See id. at A17. Prior to this announcement, in 2011, President Obama and Secretary
of State Hillary Rodham Clinton pledged to “use all the tools of American diplomacy,
including the potent enticement of foreign aid,” to promote gay rights and “combat efforts by
other nations that criminalize homosexual conduct.” Steven Lee Myers & Helene Cooper, U.S.
to Aid Gay Rights Abroad, Obama and Clinton Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2011, at A4.
249. According to a number of polls conducted in 2012, President Obama’s support for the
freedom to marry influenced African-American voters’ views of that issue. One report in
particular found African-American support for same-sex marriage at 59 percent after the
President’s announcement, compared with 41 percent beforehand. See Scott Clement &
Sandhya Somashekhar, Opposition to Gay Marriage Hits a Low, WASH. POST, May 23, 2012,
at A3. A second report conducted in mid-September 2012 found that 44 percent of black voters
were in favor of same-sex marriage, up from 33 percent in January 2012. William Selway,
Black Shift on Maryland Gay Marriage Pits Clergy Against NAACP, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-19/black-shift-on-maryland-gay-
marriage-pits-clergy-against-naacp. A late September 2012 poll for the Baltimore Sun showed
a larger shift: more than half of black likely voters were in favor of the right of gay couples to
marry, up from less than a third in March. See id.
250. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 650-A (2011), available at http://www.mainelegislature.
org/legis/statutes/19-a/title19-A.pdf; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 2013); WASH.
REV. CODE § 24.04.010 (2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=26.04.
010#. Voters in a fourth state, Minnesota, rejected a referendum that would have limited
marriage to opposite-sex couples. See Same-Sex Marriage in Minnesota, MINNESOTA LEGIS-
LATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY, http://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/issues/issues.aspx?issue=gay (last
updated June 2013).
251. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West 2013);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-1 (West 2013).
252. Hawaii and Illinois both embraced the freedom to marry through legislation. Hawaii
Marriage Equality Act of 2013, HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-17 (West 2013); Religious Freedom and
Marriage Fairness Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/10 (West 2014). In New Jersey, after the
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President’s 2013 inauguration speech, which included allusions to
Seneca Falls, Selma, and Stonewall, reaffirmed his commitment to
LGBT equality by announcing that “[o]ur journey is not complete
until our gay brothers and sisters are treated like anyone else under
the law[.]”  At numerous turns, the President demonstrated253
himself to be “a proud partner in the journey toward LGBT equal-
ity.”254
IV. PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ACTIVE VIRTUES
The Obama Administration’s commitment to the principle of
gay rights—including its nondefense of DOMA—provides a useful
case study for thinking about presidential constitutionalism and its
core features—authority, intent, and effect—outlined in Part I.
Regarding presidential authority, there is little question that the
Obama Administration’s nondefense of DOMA falls within a long-
standing, if sparingly used, presidential power not to defend (or,
even more rarely, not to enforce) statutes the President believes are
unconstitutional.  In terms of intent, the DOMA policy was255
coupled with a clear effort by the Administration to champion not
only an outcome in the Windsor case and related litigation, but
also a new constitutional rule applying heightened scrutiny to all
forms of sexual-orientation-based discrimination.  In the end, the256
state supreme court denied the Christie Administration’s request for a stay of a lower court
decision directing the State of New Jersey to permit same-sex marriages beginning October
21, 2013, Garden State Equality v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036, 1045 (N.J. 2013), the Administration
decided not to appeal the lower court ruling. As a result, gay and lesbian couples are now able
to marry in New Jersey. Kate Zernike & Marc Santora, As Gays Marry in New Jersey, Christie
Yields, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, at A1. On December 19, 2013, the New Mexico Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the freedom to marry for same-sex couples. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d
865, 871-72 (N.M. 2013).
253. See President Barack Obama, The White House, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-
address-president-barack-obama).
254. President Barack Obama, The White House, Presidential Proclamation—Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Pride Month (May 31, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/03/presidential-proclamation-lgbt-pride-
month). 
255. See supra notes 47, 77.
256. Granted, the Obama Administration’s interpretation did not come without its share
of potential contradictions. While the Administration urged that the legislation be invalidated
under a heightened scrutiny regime, it also stated that “[i]f asked ... for the position of the
1766 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1719
Administration’s constitutional argument did not bring about all of
its intended effects: although the Second Circuit did adopt the
Administration’s position,  the Supreme Court paid little attention257
to the heightened scrutiny point in Windsor or in Hollingsworth v.
Perry,  which it handed down on the same day. The Windsor Court258
instead applied ordinary rational basis review to assess DOMA’s
constitutionality and struck it down under that test.259
A. Nondefense of DOMA and the Scholarly Debate
Scholars and judges alike have expressed grave skepticism about
the Obama Administration’s enforce-but-not-defend policy,  with260
some of the leading criticisms coming from the Departmentalist
camp. Although one might imagine praise for the Obama Administra-
tion’s questioning of a law that undermines the President’s best
interpretation of the Constitution, adherents of Departmentalism
contend that President Obama failed to follow through on his
principles by, among other things, continuing to enforce DOMA
after declaring it unconstitutional; championing heightened judicial
scrutiny for laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion; and allowing the Court to have the last word on DOMA’s
enforceability. Prakash, in an article co-authored with Neal Devins,
rejects the Obama Administration’s heightened scrutiny argument
as “obscuring and, possibly sacrificing, the President’s constitutional
vision.”  They argue that the President, rather than taking a261
position contingent on the heightened scrutiny argument, should
United States in the event those courts determine that the applicable standard is rational
basis, the Department will state that, consistent with the position it has taken in prior cases,
a reasonable argument for Section 3’s constitutionality may be proffered under that
permissive standard.” Holder Letter, supra note 25.
257. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012).
258. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). Perry was a constitutional
challenge to California’s Proposition 8, which denied same-sex couples the right to marry. The
Perry Court ruled that Proposition 8’s proponents, who intervened as defendants in the trial
court proceedings, lacked standing to appeal the lower court opinion. Id. at 2662-68. The
Court’s standing ruling left intact the trial court decision invalidating Proposition 8. 
259. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”).
260. See, e.g., supra note 26 and accompanying text.
261. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 53, at 570.
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have simply found that DOMA violated any standard of review.262
Doing so would “have more forcefully articulated the constitutional,
animus-based objections to the DOMA.”  As Prakash writes263
elsewhere, the Obama Administration’s policy amounted to a
“sacrifice of constitutional principle at the altar of political expedi-
ency.”  Once the President determined that “DOMA [was]264
unconstitutional, he should neither [have] enforce[d] nor defend[ed]
it.”265
Interestingly, Meltzer and Johnsen, both of whom typify middle-
ground approaches to presidential constitutionalism, reach contrary
conclusions where the nondefense of DOMA is concerned. Johnsen
sees the policy as “consistent with executive branch precedent in a
discrete category of historic cases involving the fundamental
meaning of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.”  She266
embraces the President’s effort to engage a litigation strategy
around DOMA that reinforces his position on the issue of gay rights
more broadly:
I believe that a President may ... choose to tell the public and the
courts what he actually believes to be true about the constitu-
tional status of sexual orientation discrimination, one of the
great defining civil rights issues of our day. A President may
262. See id. at 570-71. The authors critique the Obama Administration’s constitutional
position as wrongheaded because “the Supreme Court has twice declined to hold that discrim-
ination against gays warrants heightened review and every circuit court that has ruled on the
constitutionality of the DOMA has employed rational review.” Id. at 570. That statement,
however factually correct when it was made (but which is no longer true today), see Windsor
v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying heightened scrutiny to invalidate
DOMA Section 3), sounds more akin to Judicial Supremacy—namely that presidential
constitutional interpretations should hew current precedent—than to Departmentalism. 
263. Devins & Prakash, supra note 53, at 571. Prakash also argues that the
Administration’s heightened scrutiny argument conflicts with President Obama’s May 2012
declaration that although he supports the freedom of gay couples to marry, he believes that
the ultimate decision whether to recognize marriages should be left to the states. Prakash,
Missing Links, supra note 54, at 554-55 (“[I]n reiterating his opposition to a federal
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, he insisted that the issue should be
decided on a state-by-state basis and not be ‘federalized.’”) (citation omitted). Prakash argues
that the President “cannot simultaneously conclude that DOMA is unconstitutional under
existing equal protection doctrine and yet also imagine that the states may constitutionally
refuse to permit or recognize same-sex marriage.” Id. at 555.
264. See Prakash, Missing Links, supra note 54, at 556. 
265. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 53, at 509 (citation omitted).
266. Johnsen, Defend Constitutional Equality, supra note 66, at 614.
1768 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1719
contribute to what he views as a rare and historic moment of
advancement in the Court’s understanding of constitutional
equality for a disadvantaged group rather than defend a
particular instance of discrimination against that group. The
President, as the single nationally elected representative, is a
particularly valuable participant in this historic constitutional
debate about the meaning of equality in the United States—in
a sense, about who constitutes “We the People.”267
Although Meltzer credits the important role of prior administra-
tions in promoting civil rights, he criticizes the Obama Administra-
tion’s nondefense of DOMA. He argues, for example, that the
Truman Administration’s argument against all state-sponsored
legal segregation in Sweatt and McLaurin, though in direct conflict
with congressional statutes that appeared to mandate segregation
in education,  was appropriate given the “exceptional case”  of268 269
race.  In the case of gender, Meltzer indicates that executive270
constitutionalism was appropriate in light of previous Supreme
Court rulings that had outlawed gender stereotyping.  Once the271
Court applied heightened scrutiny to gender-based classifications,
“defending each provision to the death until the Supreme Court
struck it down would have been pointless.”  But Meltzer under-272
stands the gay rights context somewhat differently. Although he
finds DOMA “misguided, offensive, and quite possibly unconstitu-
tional,”  he argues the statute neither infringed on Article II nor273
267. Id. at 615.
268. See Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1207 (“Various acts of Congress at least presupposed
that the schools in the District of Columbia would be segregated, and the District of
Columbia’s brief in Bolling v. Sharpe took the view that these statutes mandated segre-
gation.”) (citations omitted); see also Johnsen, Defend Constitutional Equality, supra note 66,
at 615 (noting that the Solicitor General’s position in Brown and the pre-Brown cases
“jeopardized the chances the Court would uphold a federal law segregating the schools in the
District of Columbia”).
269. See Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1230-31. 
270. Id. (noting that racial discrimination is the “greatest deprivation of constitutional
liberty—apart from slavery itself—that the United States has ever seen, one that included
a virtually complete exclusion of the victims of discrimination from access to the political
processes”). Further, he contends that segregation “critically affected national foreign-policy
interests.” See id. at 1231.
271. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
272. Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1194 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 914).
273. See id. at 1209. 
2014] PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 1769
was patently unconstitutional. Thus, DOMA did not satisfy the
established DOJ criteria warranting presidential nondefense.  The274
Obama Administration’s decision not to defend Section 3 thus
undermined “the wisdom of the conventional practice of providing
a defense even of statutes that the incumbent administration views
as offensive and possibly invalid.”275
Meltzer argues that the gay rights context implicates different
constitutional and institutional concerns than race or gender.  In276
his opinion, neither the Obama Administration’s commitment to
heightened scrutiny for sexual-orientation-based discrimination, nor
its view that the intervening years since passage of DOMA had
undermined any “professionally responsible arguments” in its
favor,  was a sufficient basis to refuse to defend the statute.  In277 278
short, the Obama Administration lacked a basis in the proper
institutional or historically based justifications for presidential
nondefense.279
On the question of race, Meltzer’s argument is that the urgency
of the constitutional wrongs prior to Brown required a change in the
law and those wrongs were of a different magnitude than the
urgencies presented by sexual orientation discrimination.  On the280
274. See id. at 1231-32.
275. See id. at 1186-87, 1208-27; see also Charles Fried, The Solicitor General’s Office,
Tradition, and Conviction, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 549, 549 (2012) (lamenting the “quite
unjustified decision of the Obama Justice Department and the Solicitor General’s Office not
further to defend DOMA”).
276. See Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1189, 1230-32.
277. See Holder Letter, supra note 25.
278. See Meltzer, supra note 40, at 1213-21.
279. See id. at 1231-32 (noting that the decision not to defend DOMA lacked “features that
might argue for permitting the executive to refuse to enforce or defend an act of Congress:
DOMA was not passed over a presidential veto resting on a constitutional objection; the issue
is not one—like military readiness—over which the president might be thought to have a
special grant of constitutional authority and claim to expertise; the statute was not a relic
from a different era, nor was it a brand new enactment that was quickly deemed to be
indefensible; it had been defended by prior administrations, and the precedents regarding its
constitutionality were anything but uniformly against the statute’s validity; the refusal to
defend did not involve a failure, after lower court decisions, to seek Supreme Court review,
a situation that requires the solicitor general to consider the Court’s limited docket; the
constitutional question did not depend upon statutory implementation by an independent
agency that the president could not control and that remained free to file its own brief in
defense; and Congress did not overlook the constitutional question when passing the bill”)
(citations omitted).
280. See id. at 1231.
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question of gender, there were Supreme Court precedents support-
ing presidential decisions not to enforce or defend statutes mandat-
ing discrimination,  something lacking in the gay rights context.281
Of course, it turned out that executive branch interpretations of
equal protection in the gender context exceeded the Court’s in at
least one important case.  Moreover, it is not always so easy to282
distinguish between the implementation of the Court’s prior rulings
on the one hand, and promoting the President’s own view of the
Constitution’s operative meaning on the other. After all, reason-
able minds will disagree whether a prior Supreme Court decision
necessarily controls a future case. As Frank Easterbrook has
pointed out:
Assuming the Court’s opinions have generality and force beyond
the parties, the President must have the ability to declare laws
unconstitutional in the course of applying the governing rules.
To apply the rules includes the power to interpret them.... If the
President may go beyond a decision’s four corners to implement
“the principle” found there, he must have the ability to imple-
ment a principle even when others disagree with his interpreta-
tion.283
Easterbrook argues that “what counts as a ‘similar’ decision ... will
depend on the level of generality selected, a question to which there
is no right answer. To grant the President the power to generalize
is to grant him the power to make independent constitutional
decisions.”284
From this perspective, presidential assessments of statutes
discriminating on the basis of gender were not necessarily driven by
mere implementations of prior rulings; these decisions rested on an
exercise of independent executive judgment about constitutional
meaning. Seen this way, the differences among the various presi-
dential constitutional interpretations in the race, gender, and sexual
orientation contexts may be less evident than otherwise believed.
281. See id. at 1194.
282. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text. 
283. Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 914.
284. Id.
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In any event, comparing the precise doctrinal contexts surround-
ing race, gender, and sexual orientation may overlook other aspects
of, and reasons for, presidential constitutionalism that can supply
those acts with normative backing. Certainly, the President has a
role in asserting constitutional wrongs he believes to be deep,
urgent, and worthy of change. Moreover, considering the difficulty
of assessing any given wrong at a given moment in time (for the
wrongs of discrimination are often best understood in hindsight), it
may be useful to evaluate a particular instance of presidential
constitutionalism through the lens of his broader dedication to the
particular principle at stake. In other words, rather than compare,
for example, the President’s nondefense of DOMA to acts of non-
defense by prior presidents, it may be equally valuable to consider
the policy in light of his commitment to ending discrimination
against LGBT people and same-sex couples.  285
The Obama Administration’s nondefense of DOMA is rendered
understandable, and more firmly grounded in coherent and
transparent constitutional principle, when considered in conjunction
with the range of his commitments to LGBT equality spanning
marriage, employment, housing, health care, and education. These
additional policies bolster the President’s belief that the constitu-
tional question regarding gay rights is sufficiently urgent to call into
question the validity of a federal law. All of these acts are part of a
presidential role in campaigning the coordinate branches—and, in
the case of DOMA, the Supreme Court—to reach a similar conclu-
sion. To borrow language from Windsor, once the President made a
“principled determination” that DOMA was unconstitutional, his
decision to undermine Congress, although “a difficult choice,”  was286
not only legitimate—but vital—to bring about a “definitive verdict
[regarding] the law’s constitutionality.”287
Grounding individual acts of presidential constitutionalism
within a given President’s larger vision and commitment to
principle helps address a concern about stopping points common to
middle-ground theories. For example, Johnsen asks:
285. See supra Part III.
286. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
287. Holder Letter, supra note 25.
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[A]t what point does the executive branch hold a sufficiently firm
view of a law’s constitutional infirmity to trigger the duties?
Upon an OLC determination reached in reviewing pending
legislation that later passes? A Solicitor General determination
reached in the course of litigation? Or with constitutional
concerns voiced by the President in a signing statement?288
An inquiry into a President’s broader commitment to principle helps
address these questions about the proper limits to presidential
constitutionalism. In the case of Windsor, the Obama Administra-
tion’s policy fit squarely within a broader dedication to LGBT
equality—which explains and legitimates that particular instance
of constitutional interpretation. As a President and candidate,
Obama campaigned vigorously on those issues, making his point of
view increasingly clear and transparent. By using the bully pulpit
to champion the issue of gay rights, his decision not to defend
DOMA was bolstered by the comparative institutional advantages
of his office—not the least of which were accountability and
expertise.
B. The Normative Case for Undermining DOMA
While Departmentalists have charged the Obama Administration
with putting expediency ahead of principle,  consider what might289
have occurred had the President decided simply to stop enforcing
DOMA. Such a decision would have greatly upset the status quo and
required vast regulatory adjustments without the support of a
congressional delegation or judicial decree. Administrative agencies
would have had to shift policies, create new forms, and educate
lower-level bureaucrats on a variety of matters—all of which could
be undone should a subsequent administration change course or a
court sustain the statute’s constitutionality.  Some federal officials290
288. Johnsen, Defend Constitutional Equality, supra note 66, at 604.
289. Prakash, Missing Links, supra note 54, at 556 (calling President Obama’s nondefense
of DOMA a “sacrifice of constitutional principle at the altar of political expediency”). 
290. But see Huq, supra note 137, at 1025 (“Holder might have argued that sudden
nonenforcement of a thousand-plus provisions affected by DOMA Section 3 would have
imposed unacceptable transition costs. But the government has dealt successfully with similar
transition problems in addressing gender-related equal protection rules that the Court began
elaborating in the 1970s. In any case, it is also hard to see why the transition costs would be
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would likely have resisted.  The Obama Administration’s enforce-291
but-not-defend policy gave the agencies the opportunity to prepare
for a potential Supreme Court ruling striking down Section 3.
Judging by the speed with which those agencies moved to imple-
ment Windsor,  they appeared to have used that time to prepare.292
The Obama Administration’s decision to interpret Windsor broadly
(rather than narrowly by confining the holding to the federal income
or estate-tax context) highlights yet another way that the Obama
Administration placed its constitutional principle behind the
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.
The type of non-enforcement policy Departmentalists envision
would have led to a much different set of consequences. First, it
would have rendered moot the pending challenges to DOMA’s
constitutionality, as no plaintiff could demonstrate harm to satisfy
basic standing requirements.  In that event, Windsor noted, the293
“[r]ights and privileges of hundreds of thousands of persons would
be adversely affected.”  While a non-enforcement policy would294
likely lead to an immediate disbursement of benefits to married
couples, those couples suddenly receiving benefits would be at risk
of losing them later if a future administration changed course. Gay
rights advocates might win a short-term battle but suffer major
setbacks in the long-term war. Moreover, these types of abrupt
changes could draw fierce resistance or backlash from the coordi-
nate branches or future courts. Some opposing the President’s
less if the same result were to be imposed by judicial fiat.”).
291. One example of such bureaucratic resistance occurred recently in the immigration
context. On July 31, 2013, a federal district court threw out a lawsuit brought by five officials
within Immigration and Customs Enforcement against President Obama over his Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O (N.D.
Tex. July 31, 2013). Under DACA, immigration officers were instructed to consider favorable
exercises of discretion to certain foreign nationals who were brought to the U.S. as children.
See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-process (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
292. See supra notes 231-34, 245-46 and accompanying text. 
293. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (noting that the Court
would lack jurisdiction “if the Executive had taken the further step of paying Windsor the
refund to which she was entitled under the District Court’s ruling”).
294. Id. at 2688 (“That numerical prediction may not be certain, but it is certain that the
cost in judicial resources and expense of litigation for all persons adversely affected would be
immense.”).
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decision to stop enforcing DOMA would likely argue for his impeach-
ment.295
Rather than adopt a position anchored squarely within Judicial
Supremacy or Departmentalism, the Obama Administration’s
DOMA policy hewed aspects of both. On the one hand, the President
was determined not to upset the status quo unless and until the
judiciary issued a definitive verdict on the statute’s enforceability;
on the other hand, the President refused to defend a congressional
act based on a novel interpretation of the Constitution that the
Supreme Court had not, and still has not, endorsed. While scholars
have criticized this approach as unprincipled, the policy was, in
many ways, similar to prior acts of presidential constitutionalism
that were intended to promote collective branch consensus around
a new and more ideal constitutional position. The Administration’s
policy reflected interpretive humility by enforcing a law it believed
to be unconstitutional while maintaining order, preserving the
status quo, and promoting additional conversation over gay rights
within other institutions—including courts, state legislatures, and
within the culture generally. At the same time, the Administration
pursued an aggressive litigation strategy over DOMA’s constitution-
ality that advanced bold arguments about gay and lesbian equality
that transcended DOMA. That larger commitment to principle,
which resonates with so many of the Obama Administration’s
positions on gay rights, stretches well beyond the decision not to
defend a particular piece of legislation. The President’s refusal to
defend DOMA in court was part of his larger effort to catalyze,
rather than preclude, inter-branch dialogue over difficult interpre-
tive questions.
C. Presidential Constitutionalism and Judicial Doctrine
The Obama Administration’s deeper commitment to equal
protection spanned numerous policy initiatives and manifested a
295. See id. at 2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (preferring to leave the question of DOMA’s
enforceability “to a tug of war between the President and the Congress, which has
innumerable means (up to and including impeachment) of compelling the President to enforce
the laws it has written”). President Andrew Johnson was impeached (though not convicted)
for refusing to enforce the Tenure of Office Act, which the Supreme Court later ruled to be
unconstitutional. See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 47, at 8.
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clear intention to enlist the courts in bringing about more rights-
affirming principles. In that regard, presidential constitutionalism
worked in tandem with coordinate institutions—especially the
courts—to champion latent Supreme Court interpretations within
the “profound fault lines ... at the very foundations of the enterprise”
of constitutional law.  Rather than reject the Court’s prior rulings296
for their indeterminacy,  the President worked within the existing297
doctrine to assert his own, independent interpretive role. 
The Supreme Court routinely leaves undecided many of the larger
questions presented in litigation by announcing narrow decisions
that avoid more than they decide, especially in the context of civil
rights rulings. This tendency—whether revealed through the
exercise of the “passive virtues”  or the “under-enforcement” of298
constitutional norms —underlies many of the Court’s rulings299
regarding constitutional law and civil rights. Scholarly dissatisfac-
tion with under-theorized decisions is reflected in Michael Dorf ’s
statement, expressed shortly after Windsor, that “there is much to
regret about the fact that in Romer, Lawrence, and now Windsor,
296. Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 291, 295 (2005).
297. Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation,
21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 770 (2013) (discussing the extent to which indeterminacy
is an inescapable part of constitutional law).
298. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 65-72, 259-65 (1st ed. 1962); see Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court,
1960 Term: Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 50-51 (1961); see also
SUNSTEIN, JUDICIAL MINIMALISM, supra note 1; Michael Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on the
Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV. 73, 73-74 (2000) (tracing the development of
judicial minimalism theory from Bickel to Sunstein and suggesting that both favor judicial
restraint as a way to increase public discourse and majoritarian decision making); Jan
Komarek, Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent, 61 AM. J.
COMP. L. 149, 164 n.96 (2013); cf. Justin R. Long, Against Certification, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
114, 134-35 (2009) (asserting that although Sunstein is the most prominent contemporary
defender and refiner of the passive virtues, “he distinguishes his own views from Bickel’s by
emphasizing that judicial minimalism is meant to maximize and guard the deliberative space
of the political branches rather than the legitimacy or power of the judiciary”). 
299. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1239-42 (1978); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 43
(2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1543-44 (1987); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 467-70; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2023-24 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78
IND. L.J. 1, 17-19 (2003).
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the Court has failed to specify the level of scrutiny it is applying as
a matter of equal protection doctrine (in Romer and Windsor) or
substantive due process doctrine (in Lawrence).”  He notes that “it300
would seem much more straightforward for the Court simply to say
that laws drawing distinctions based on sexual orientation are
subject to heightened scrutiny.”  To be sure, a heightened scrutiny301
ruling from the Court would have tremendous cascading effects in
other legal precincts by toppling an entire wave of anti-gay law in
education, employment, and family law.  But to the extent that302
courts are unwilling to craft ideal solutions to all constitutional
controversies, a judiciary-centric perspective can obscure ways that
the coordinate branches can contribute to the development of
constitutional law. To the extent that Windsor, like earlier pro-
nouncements on gay rights, adopts a narrower approach to con-
stitutional interpretation based on the Court’s belief in its “limited
fact-finding and policy-making competence,”  the President can303
help shape constitutional interpretations and outcomes through his
independent faculty of interpretation.
300. Michael C. Dorf, A Publicity Updated and Then Three Thoughts on Justice Scalia’s
Dissent in Windsor, DORF ON LAW (June 28, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/
06/a-publicity-update-and-then-three.html.
301. Id.
302. See Joseph Landau, The DOMA Ripple Effect, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/85085/obama-doma-gay-marriage-law (noting that
heightened scrutiny would likely lead to the invalidation of virtually every remaining law that
mandates discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in, for example, education,
employment, and family law).
303. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2112 n.193 (1990). Although Windsor is doctrinally a case about rational basis review, the
Court’s commitment to lesbian and gay equality stretches beyond the ordinary concept of
rational basis analysis to embrace a deeper conception of self-government that has ties to the
political process and the belonging of same-sex couples in that polity. For example, Windsor
contains powerful rhetoric supporting the dignity of LGBT individuals and provides strong
language supporting the moral worthiness of same-sex relationships and same-sex families.
The Court describes Windsor and her wife, Spyer, as “long[ing] to marry” and desiring a
relationship that would “occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man and woman in
lawful marriage.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (emphasis added).
The Court writes of a historical change whereby States were beginning to recognize, validate,
and respect relationship recognition for “those same-sex couples who wish to define
themselves by their commitment to each other” and “affirm their commitment ... before their
children, their family, their friends, and their community.” Id.
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In the gay rights context, rulings such as Romer,  Lawrence,304 305
and Windsor arguably reflect the under-enforcement of the constitu-
tional norms at stake. Although these rulings leave open—and may
even anticipate—a ripening principle of heightened scrutiny,
judicial minimalism can invite important opportunities for presiden-
tial intervention. When the Court avoids addressing the larger,
substantive questions, the President can step into the breach by
placing his own interpretation of the Constitution in the service of
individual rights. Indeed, the Court’s tendency to under-enforce
norms of equality and non-discrimination creates a vacuum that the
political branches, and especially the executive, can fill in advance
of—and in anticipation of—future congressional legislation or
judicial opinions. Rather than looking to the judiciary as the sole
guardian of freedom from executive incursion, the executive can be
a helpmate in the struggle for civil rights advancement and
innovation.
Scholars have made similar arguments about Congress’s role in
enforcing the Constitution through its Commerce Clause  and306
Fourteenth Amendment powers.  Yet despite Congress’s tremen-307
dous potential to exert influence over constitutional law, its success
rate in passing legislation on anything—let alone civil rights—has
been woefully absent of late. When the Court has not been hostile
to Congress’s efforts to push through civil rights legislation,308
Congress has been the victim of its own internal mischief-making.309
Recently, its legislating power has come to a halt, reducing its
ability to fill gaps left open by the Court.  But a joint executive-310
304. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
305. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
306. See supra note 4.
307. See supra note 5.
308. See supra note 7.
309. The government shutdown of 2013 was a low point in that regard, with Congress
nearly failing to avert default. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Republicans
Back Down, Ending Crisis Over Shutdown and Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/congress-budget-debate.html. After a similar standoff
in 2011, federal lawmakers brokered a deal to raise the debt ceiling only two days before a
default seemed likely, resulting in, among other things, a downgrade in the U.S. credit rating.
See Janet Novack, Federal Government Begins First Shutdown in 17 Years, FORBES (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2013/09/30/clock-ticks-to-first-federal-shut
down-in-17-years/.
310. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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judicial dialogue on constitutional meaning may provide a new way
for the political branches—and especially the President as a
constitutional actor—to advance the doctrine. In other words, if the
Court insists on continuing to play a passive role, and “legislative
inertia [has] prevent[ed] judicial silence from having constructive
force,”  the executive may be an appropriate actor to help fill out311
the contours of the resulting doctrinal limbo.
In the area of equal protection, where the state of the law often
remains unclear, there are good reasons to see the President as a
proper actor engaged in a dialogue with the Court. The President
already interprets the Constitution when he implements prior
Supreme Court decisions in ordinary policy-making contexts. For
example, before Windsor, the Obama Administration announced
numerous policies that expanded statutory and regulatory pro-
tections for LGBT individuals and same-sex couples in areas such
as labor and employment, immigration, health care, and housing.312
Those policies, which were made with the explicit intention not to
violate DOMA,  likely rested on the Supreme Court’s prior equal313
protection rulings. The President’s DOMA policy, by contrast, was
part of a call for heightened scrutiny and a more direct effort to
engage the Court on the proper construction of constitutional
meaning. While the Supreme Court did not ultimately accept that
principle, there was a certain consistency across all of the Presi-
dent’s gay rights policies, regardless of whether they rested on
rational basis review or heightened scrutiny—standards that, in any
event, potentially converge at the Court’s “rational basis plus”
jurisprudence.  Regardless, the Obama Administration’s efforts did314
not fall flat, coinciding with the first-ever federal appellate ruling
applying heightened scrutiny to sexual-orientation-based discrimi-
311. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges As Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1721 (1998).
312. See Landau, supra note 215, at 624-27. 
313. See, e.g., Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies on Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,393
(June 17, 2009) (directing the Director of the Office of Personnel Management and the
Secretary of State to find ways, “consistent with Federal law,” to expand benefits for the
same-sex partners of foreign-service and executive branch government employees).
314. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580-84 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(describing the Court’s equal protection cases as applying a “more searching” form of rational
basis scrutiny where animus-based legislation is concerned).
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nation.  The case study of LGBT rights demonstrates that when315
the Supreme Court under-enforces the full scope of the norm at
issue, the President can be in a particularly opportune position to
champion new constitutional meaning by enlisting the Court’s prior
decisions in the advancement of new constitutional principles.
D. Presidential Constitutionalism and the “Zone of Twilight”
By 2011, when the Obama Administration stopped defending
DOMA, the House and Senate majorities were unable to move
legislation invalidating DOMA through Congress. This is not
because DOMA was hugely popular—on the contrary, many in
Congress (including some who voted for DOMA when it was enacted
in 1996)  opposed the law—but it was equally true that congressio-316
nal inertia would ensure that DOMA remained on the books for
some time. When members of Congress introduced the Respect for
Marriage Act  to repeal DOMA, it was clear that the bill’s317
backers—more than 150 House cosponsors and more than thirty
Senate cosponsors—could not muster the support to move the
legislation through Congress.  But Congress’s impasse did not318
preclude the President from exercising constitutional interpretation
to effectively work with the Court to dismantle a law that was not
only in decline, but also inconsistent with the emerging law in many
states. Achieving the result through collective branch action, as
opposed to a univocal decision by a single branch, was a superior
way of resolving a highly contentious substantive constitutional
question.319
315. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012). 
316. More than 130 House members—some of whom voted for DOMA—also came forward
to sign onto an amicus brief calling upon the federal courts to strike down Section 3. See, e.g.,
Brief of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives—Including Objecting Members of the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, Representatives Nancy Pelosi and Steny H. Hoyer—as Amici
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees and Urging Affirmance at 2, Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214).
317. H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 598, 112th Cong. (2011).
318. Max Gouttebroze, “Respect for Marriage Act” Reintroduced to Ensure Full DOMA
Repeal, GLAAD (June 26, 2013), http://www.glaad.org/blog/respect-marriage-act-re-introduced-
ensure-full-doma-repeal.
319. Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
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While there are a number of important, separation-of-powers-
based reasons why a President might seek to engage in certain self-
help measures where constitutional interpretation is concerned,320
one should not underestimate the President’s unique ability to work
with the coordinate branches to invest the law with new meaning.
As noted in the Attorney General’s letter to Speaker John Boehner,
the decision to enforce DOMA while not defending it in court was
intended to “respect[ ] the actions of the prior Congress that enacted
DOMA, and ... recognize[ ] the judiciary as the final arbiter of the
constitutional claims raised.”  In the case of Windsor, that dialogue321
was about reaching a bilateral endorsement between the Court and
the President regarding a complex issue of substantive law in which
the proper course of action for the President was not obvious. This
course of conduct is reminiscent of the methodology Justice Jackson
discussed in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, in which he evaluated presidential action according to
the extent of congressional or constitutional authorization.322
Although Jackson’s concurrence articulated a tripartite framework
for considering the validity of executive action vis-à-vis Congress,323
the framework is potentially analogous to the shared interpretative
powers between the executive and the Court. Understood this way,
the executive might validly exercise some role in constitutional
interpretation so long as the Court has authorized room for political
branch action by leaving a gap in its constitutional analysis.
Assuming as a theoretical matter that the Court under-enforces
constitutional norms by broadly charting out areas of constitutional
320. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 268 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001) (discussing the horizontal separation of powers as a
means for “ambition ... to counteract ambition”).
321. Holder Letter, supra note 25.
322. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
323. Id. at 635-38 (“(1) When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.... (2) When the President acts
in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.... [and] (3) When the President
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”).
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protections for individual rights while leaving the precise doctrinal
boundaries ill-defined,  the Court’s restrained behavior arguably324
constitutes either authorization of some level of constitutional
interpretation by the executive, or a “zone of twilight” wherein the
executive possesses concurrent interpretative authority with
Congress.325
In other words, if Youngstown held that the executive’s powers
“are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or con-
junction with those of Congress,”  the same might be said with re-326
spect to the executive’s constitutional interpretations. The Court, by
speaking broadly to a particular constitutional issue while leaving
the precise boundaries of that question undefined, might “enable, if
not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”327
From this perspective, presidential efforts to interpret the Constitu-
tion, similar to invocations of presidential authority in the absence
of constitutional or congressional authority, “depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than
on abstract theories of law.”328
While the overlap between the legislative and executive branches
on legislative matters may be more immediately discernible than
the overlap between the judicial and executive branches on interpre-
tive matters,  courts and legal commentators have consistently329
found that the executive branch may validly exercise some level of
interpretative power.  Where those constitutional interpretations330
324. See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
325. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
326. Id. at 635.
327. Id. at 637.
328. Id. 
329. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (regarding the President’s power to veto legislation)
and id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (regarding the President’s treaty making powers). While the common
law tradition suggests some blurring of the lines between the legislative and judicial
functions, at least one scholar has suggested that Youngstown “does not provide any judicial
tools to assist in determining the balance of power when the struggle is between the executive
and the judiciary.” See Elizabeth Bahr & Josh Blackman, Youngstown’s Fourth Tier: Is There
A Zone of Insight Beyond the Zone of Twilight?, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 541, 544 (2010). 
330. See Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudical Constitution, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1533, 1580-82 (2007) (“[C]ourts and scholars commonly regard constitutional
interpretation as ‘a collaborative enterprise in which each branch ... recognize[s] its own
limitations and the relative strengths and functions of the other coordinate branches,’ but still
accord the Supreme Court the final say in the constitutional disputes that come before it.”)
(quoting Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism, supra note 74, at 109). 
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have yet to fully ripen, the President can be uniquely qualified to
“construe constitutional ambiguities as [he] sees fit.”  Presidential331
constitutionalism, when done properly, can help usher into law
emerging ideas about constitutional protection, supplying the Court
with an additional tool for striking a balance between principled
rulings and expedient ones. In the context of DOMA, the President’s
nondefense policy, rather than skirting his duties of constitutional
interpretation, approached the Court as a helpmate, or interlocutor,
to advance a shared understanding of constitutional meaning. His
interventions encouraged (or at least allowed for) the participation
of other branches of government in that interpretative enterprise.
E. Presidential Constitutionalism and Vertical Separation of          
Powers
Although presidential constitutionalism is largely a matter of
engaging the horizontal federal branches of government, it can
implicate the vertical dimension of intra-branch decisions within the
executive branch as well as the President’s response to, and
interaction with, state actors.  In the gay rights context, President332
Obama’s constitutionalism has served as a way of enlisting those
institutions in outcomes they might have been unable or unwilling
to reach on their own. From this perspective, the President’s role in
constitutional interpretation contributes to a broader legal process
that includes both substantive questions of constitutional value as
well as institutional arrangements, such as the President’s relation-
ship with Congress, the courts, the federal bureaucracy, and the
states. There are important ways in which the President’s constitu-
tional interpretations, including his refusal to defend unconstitu-
tional acts, intersect with similar decisions by state officials who have
increasingly called into question the validity of state legislation.333
In 2013, legislatures in Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota,
and Rhode Island passed marriage legislation,  and in 2012, three334
331. Sunstein, supra note 55, at 2584.
332. On the topic of vertical constitutionalism more generally, see Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006).
333. On the issue of executive nondefense at the state level, see Katherine Shaw,
Constitutional Nondefense in the States, 114 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
334. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
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states passed referenda approving the freedom of same-sex couples
to marry.  Moreover—and in parallel with the Obama Administra-335
tion’s work advancing LGBT rights—executive branch officers at the
state level are playing an active part in developments within their
respective states. State executive officials have refused to defend the
constitutionality of laws denying marriage rights to same-sex
couples in California, Illinois, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia.  In New Jersey, executive branch officials defended the336
state’s marriage ban but chose not to appeal a lower-court ruling
recognizing the freedom of same-sex couples to marry.  In337
California, when the Governor and the Attorney General refused to
defend Proposition 8 in Hollingsworth v. Perry, private intervenors
became the law’s champions in the ensuing litigation  but were338
deemed to lack standing to pursue a federal appeal.339
Prior to Windsor, state officials also brought a challenge to the
constitutionality of DOMA. In 2010, Massachusetts officials suc-
cessfully sued the federal government over the law’s constitutional-
ity, arguing that the statute violated principles of state sovereignty
under the Tenth Amendment.  Many state attorneys general also340
issued interpretations (prior to state legislative acts or judicial
335. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
336. Robert Barnes, Virginia to Fight Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WASH. POST. (Jan. 23,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2014/01/22/85a96a10-83ac-11e3-bbe5-6a2a3
141e3a9_story.html; Juliet Eilperin, AG Won’t Defend Pennsylvania’s Gay Marriage Ban,
WASH. POST (July 11, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-11/politics/405116
10_1_gay-marriage-marriage-act-proposition-8; Gay Marriage Ban Support Slips in Nevada,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/us/gay-marriage-ban-support-
slips-in-nevada.html?_r=0; Rex Huppke & Stacy St. Clair, State’s Gay Marriage Ban
Unlawful, Alvarez Says, CHI. TRIB. (June 15, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-
06-15/news/ct-met-gay-marriage-lawsuit-20120615a_1_gay-marriage-camilla-taylor-marriage-
laws; Oregon: Attorney General Won’t Defend Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/us/oregon-attorney-general-wont-defend-ban-on-
gay-marriage.html?-r=0.
337. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
338. In Perry v. Brown, the California Supreme Court held that California law vested the
proponents of Proposition 8 standing to represent the state’s interest in the litigation. 265
P.3d 1002, 1165 (Cal. 2011). Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit held that the proponents had
Article III standing to appeal the adverse decision against them in district court. Perry v.
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1070-75 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
339. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.
340. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 252
(D. Mass. 2010), aff ’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
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decisions recognizing the freedom to marry) that out-of-state same-
sex marriages would receive full recognition as a matter of comity.341
Outside the marriage context, state officials have refused to enforce
or defend other anti-gay legislation. For instance, Florida Governor
Charlie Crist refused to appeal an intermediate appellate court
ruling that struck down Florida’s ban on adoption by gays and
lesbians, leaving the appellate decision in place as the final judicial
resolution.  These decisions by state executive officials to call into342
question their respective states’ anti-gay laws have the cumulative
effect of bolstering, in addition to mirroring, the President’s refusal
to defend DOMA in court.
341. See, e.g., Marriage—Whether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage That is Valid in the
State of Celebration May Be Recognized in Maryland, 95 Op. Md. Att’y Gen. 3 (2010),
available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2010/95oag3.pdf; Are Same-Sex Marriages
Performed in Other Jurisdictions Valid in New Mexico?, 11 Op. N.M. Att’y Gen. 01 (2011),
available at http://www.democracyfornewmexico.com/files/4-jan-11-rep.-al-park-opinion-11-
01.pdf; Letter from Patrick C. Lynch, R.I. Att’y Gen., to Jack R. Warner, Comm’r, R.I. Bd. of
Governors for Higher Educ. (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/
docs/cases/cote-whitacre-et-al-v-dept-public-health/ri-ag-statement.pdf.
342. Florida Ends Ban on Gay, Lesbian Adoptions, CNN.COM (Oct. 22, 2010, 5:21 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/22/florida.gay.adoptions/. 
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CONCLUSION: PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE NEXT
FRONTIER
The Obama Administration’s championing of civil liberties has
not only included gay rights, but also the rights of women,  foreign343
nationals,  criminal defendants,  and others. While a full344 345
assessment of those policies must await further scholarship, the gay
rights context supplies an important case study regarding the
President’s ability to work in tandem with the courts and others to
help resolve vexing constitutional issues. The President’s multiple
efforts and transparent championing of the underlying principle of
gay rights, supported by his extrajudicial interpretations, added
support and normative force to his decision not to defend DOMA.
Obama’s DOMA policy reflected a President’s deployment of the
active virtues in the service of a broader, positive constitutional
agenda that advanced his vision consistently with the values of law
and democracy.
343. One important example in the gender context is the recent decision to retire a long-
held policy excluding women from ground combat positions in the U.S. military. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Defense Department Rescinds Direct Combat Exclusion Rule;
Services to Expand Integration of Women into Previously Restricted Occupations and Units
(Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=15784.
That decision put to rest a recently litigated civil rights issue. See, e.g., Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Hegar v. Panetta, No. 3:12-cv-06005-EMC (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 27, 2012); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Baldwin v. Panetta, No.
1:12-cv-00832-RMC (D.D.C. May 23, 2012). 
344. Examples are legion and they include the Obama Administration’s strong support for
comprehensive immigration reform; its successful legal challenge to Arizona’s Support Our
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (“SB 1070”), see Arizona v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 2492 (2012); and its 2012 policy to defer action for certain young people who came to the
United States as children, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
345. See Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.justice.
gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html); Charlie Savage, Dept. of Justice Seeks
to Curtail Stiff Drug Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, at A1. 
